Men Of War Totaler Krieg

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1. Men Of War - GSM Fields of Honor - Italy vs France 1940 r r Sorry for the long wait but. Here we are with the GSM X!! R r First impression on GSM X is that this is the best version so far as quantity and quality, the italian fion you can see in this video is totally brand new compared to GSM IX and the french too get some updates to their gear.
2. Wehrmacht Uniform Totaler Krieg Panzer World War Ii German Soldiers Ww2 German Army Luftwaffe Military Photos Military History in action with belt loaded. A common practice when moving with the LMG.

The Franco-Prussian War or Franco-German War (French: Guerre franco-allemande de 1870, German: Deutsch-Französischer Krieg), often referred to in France as the War of 1870, was a conflict between the Second French Empire and later the Third French Republic, and the German states of the North German Confederation led by the Kingdom of Prussia. Lasting from 19 July 1870 to 28 January 1871, the conflict was caused by Prussian ambitions to extend German unification and French fears of the shift in the European balance of power that would result if the Prussians succeeded. Some historians argue that the Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck deliberately provoked the French into declaring war on Prussia in order to draw the independent southern German states—Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria and Hesse-Darmstadt—into an alliance with the North German Confederation dominated by Prussia, while others contend that Bismarck did not plan anything and merely exploited the circumstances as they unfolded. None, however, dispute the fact that Bismarck must have recognized the potential for new German alliances, given the situation as a whole. ^[9]

On 16 July 1870, the French parliament voted to declare war on Prussia and hostilities began three days later when French forces invaded German territory. The German coalition mobilised its troops much more quickly than the French and rapidly invaded northeastern France. The German forces were superior in numbers, had better training and leadership and made more effective use of modern technology, particularly railroads and artillery.

The official steam group for the WW2 BoE realism conversion, 'Totaler Krieg:39-45'. Each faction of each alliance, Axis powers, Commintern, and those of the Allied alliance will be represented in some form or another with no detail spared; uniforms, helmets, weaponary, soldierly equiptments, voices, soldier portraits.

A series of swift Prussian and German victories in eastern France, culminating in the Siege of Metz and the Battle of Sedan, saw French Emperor Napoleon III captured and the army of the Second Empire decisively defeated. A Government of National Defence declared the Third French Republic in Paris on 4 September and continued the war for another five months; the German forces fought and defeated new French armies in northern France. Following the Siege of Paris, the capital fell on 28 January 1871, and then a revolutionary uprising called the Paris Commune seized power in the city and held it for two months, until it was bloodily suppressed by the regular French army at the end of May 1871.

The German states proclaimed their union as the German Empire under the Prussian king Wilhelm I, finally uniting Germany as a nation-state. The Treaty of Frankfurt of 10 May 1871 gave Germany most of Alsace and some parts of Lorraine, which became the Imperial territory of Alsace-Lorraine (Reichsland Elsaß-Lothringen). The German conquest of France and the unification of Germany upset the European balance of power that had existed since the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and Otto von Bismarck maintained great authority in international affairs for two decades.

French determination to regain Alsace-Lorraine and fear of another Franco-German war, along with British apprehension about the balance of power, became factors in the causes of World War I.

• 2Opposing forces
• 3French Army incursion
• 4Prussian Army advance
• 5War of the Government of National Defence
• 6War at sea
• 7Aftermath
• 8Subsequent events
• 11References
• 12Further reading

Causes[edit]

The causes of the Franco-Prussian War are strongly rooted in the events surrounding the unification of Germany. In the aftermath of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, Prussia had annexed numerous territories and formed the North German Confederation. This new power destabilized the European balance of power established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 after the Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon III, then the emperor of France, demanded compensations in Belgium and on the left bank of the Rhine to secure France's strategic position, which the Prussian chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, flatly refused.^[10] Prussia then turned its attention towards the south of Germany, where it sought to incorporate the southern German kingdoms, Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt, into a unified Prussia-dominated Germany. France was strongly opposed to any further alliance of German states, which would have significantly strengthened the Prussian military.^[11]

In Prussia, some officials considered a war against France both inevitable and necessary to arouse German nationalism in those states that would allow the unification of a great German empire. This aim was epitomized by Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's later statement: 'I did not doubt that a Franco-German war must take place before the construction of a United Germany could be realised.'^[12] Bismarck also knew that France should be the aggressor in the conflict to bring the southern German states to side with Prussia, hence giving Germans numerical superiority.^[13] He was convinced that France would not find any allies in her war against Germany for the simple reason that 'France, the victor, would be a danger to everybody – Prussia to nobody,' and he added, 'That is our strong point.'^[14] Many Germans also viewed the French as the traditional destabilizer of Europe, and sought to weaken France to prevent further breaches of the peace.^[15]

The immediate cause of the war resided in the candidacy of Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a Prussian prince, to the throne of Spain. France feared encirclement by an alliance between Prussia and Spain. The Hohenzollern prince's candidacy was withdrawn under French diplomatic pressure, but Otto von Bismarck goaded the French into declaring war by releasing an altered summary of the Ems Dispatch, a telegram sent by William I rejecting French demands that Prussia never again support a Hohenzollern candidacy. Bismarck's summary, as mistranslated by the French press Havas, made it sound as if the king had treated the French envoy in a demeaning fashion, which inflamed public opinion in France.^[13]

French historians François Roth and Pierre Milza argue that Napoleon III was pressured by a bellicose press and public opinion and thus sought war in response to France's diplomatic failures to obtain any territorial gains following the Austro-Prussian War.^[16] Napoleon III believed he would win a conflict with Prussia. Many in his court, such as Empress Eugénie, also wanted a victorious war to resolve growing domestic political problems, restore France as the undisputed leading power in Europe, and ensure the long-term survival of the House of Bonaparte. A national plebiscite held on 8 May 1870, which returned results overwhelmingly in favor of the Emperor's domestic agenda, gave the impression that the regime was politically popular and in a position to confront Prussia. Within days of the plebiscite, France's pacifist Foreign Minister Napoléon, comte Daru was replaced by Agenor, duc de Gramont, a fierce opponent of Prussia who, as French Ambassador to Austria in 1866, had advocated an Austro-French military alliance against Prussia. Napoleon III's worsening health problems made him less and less capable of reining in Empress Eugénie, Gramont and the other members of the war party, known collectively as the 'mameluks'. For Bismarck, the nomination of Gramont was seen as 'a highly bellicose symptom'.^[17]

The Ems telegram had exactly the effect on French public opinion that Bismarck had intended. 'This text produced the effect of a red flag on the Gallic bull', Bismarck later wrote. Gramont, the French foreign minister, declared that he felt 'he had just received a slap.' The leader of the monarchists in Parliament, Adolphe Thiers, spoke for moderation, arguing that France had won the diplomatic battle and there was no reason for war, but he was drowned out by cries that he was a traitor and a Prussian. Napoleon's new prime minister, Emile Ollivier, declared that France had done all that it could humanly and honorably do to prevent the war, and that he accepted the responsibility 'with a light heart'. A crowd of 15,000–20,000 people, carrying flags and patriotic banners, marched through the streets of Paris, demanding war. On 19 July 1870 a declaration of war was sent to the Prussian government.^[18] The southern German states immediately sided with Prussia.^[13]

Opposing forces[edit]

France[edit]

The French Army consisted in peacetime of approximately 400,000 soldiers, some of them regulars, others conscripts who until 1869 served the comparatively long period of seven years with the colours. Some of them were veterans of previous French campaigns in the Crimean War, Algeria, the Franco-Austrian War in Italy, and in the Mexican campaign. However, following the 'Seven Weeks War' between Prussia and Austria four years earlier, it had been calculated that the French Army could field only 288,000 men to face the Prussian Army when potentially 1,000,000 would be required.^[19] Under Marshal Adolphe Niel, urgent reforms were made. Universal conscription (rather than by ballot, as previously) and a shorter period of service gave increased numbers of reservists, who would swell the army to a planned strength of 800,000 on mobilisation. Those who for any reason were not conscripted were to be enrolled in the Garde Mobile, a militia with a nominal strength of 400,000. However, the Franco-Prussian War broke out before these reforms could be completely implemented. The mobilisation of reservists was chaotic and resulted in large numbers of stragglers, while the Garde Mobile were generally untrained and often mutinous.^[20]

French infantry were equipped with the breech-loading Chassepot rifle, one of the most modern mass-produced firearms in the world at the time. With a rubber ring seal and a smaller bullet, the Chassepot had a maximum effective range of some 1,500 metres (4,900 ft) with a short reloading time.^[21] French tactics emphasised the defensive use of the Chassepot rifle in trench-warfare style fighting—the so-called feu de bataillon.^[22] The artillery was equipped with rifled, muzzle-loaded La Hitte guns.^[23] The army also possessed a precursor to the machine-gun: the mitrailleuse, which could unleash significant, concentrated firepower but nevertheless lacked range and was comparatively immobile, and thus prone to being easily overrun. The mitrailleuse was mounted on an artillery gun carriage and grouped in batteries in a similar fashion to cannon.^[21]

The army was nominally led by Napoleon III, with Marshals Francois Achille Bazaine and Patrice de Mac-Mahon in command of the field armies.^[24] However, there was no previously arranged plan of campaign in place. The only campaign plan prepared between 1866 and 1870 was a defensive one.^[11]

Germans[edit]

The Prussian Army was composed not of regulars but of conscripts. Service was compulsory for all men of military age, and thus Prussia and its North and South German allies could mobilise and field some 1,000,000 soldiers in time of war.^[25] German tactics emphasised encirclement battles like Cannae and using artillery offensively whenever possible. Rather than advancing in a column or line formation, Prussian infantry moved in small groups that were harder to target by artillery or French defensive fire.^[26] The sheer number of soldiers available made encirclement en masse and destruction of French formations relatively easy.^[27]

The army was equipped with the Dreyse needle gun renowned for its use at the Battle of Königgrätz, which was by this time showing the age of its 25-year-old design.^[21] The rifle had a range of only 600 m (2,000 ft) and lacked the rubber breech seal that permitted aimed shots.^[28] The deficiencies of the needle gun were more than compensated for by the famous Krupp 6-pounder (3 kg) steel breech-loading cannons being issued to Prussian artillery batteries.^[29] Firing a contact-detonated shell, the Krupp gun had a longer range and a higher rate of fire than the French bronze muzzle loading cannon, which relied on faulty time fuses.^[30]

The Prussian army was controlled by the General Staff, under Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke. The Prussian army was unique in Europe for having the only such organisation in existence, whose purpose in peacetime was to prepare the overall war strategy, and in wartime to direct operational movement and organise logistics and communications.^[31] The officers of the General Staff were hand-picked from the Prussian Kriegsakademie (War Academy). Moltke embraced new technology, particularly the railroad and telegraph, to coordinate and accelerate mobilisation of large forces.^[32]

French Army incursion[edit]

Preparations for the offensive[edit]

On 28 July 1870 Napoleon III left Paris for Metz and assumed command of the newly titled Army of the Rhine, some 202,448 strong and expected to grow as the French mobilization progressed.^[33]Marshal MacMahon took command of I Corps (4 infantry divisions) near Wissembourg, Marshal François Canrobert brought VI Corps (four infantry divisions) to Châlons-sur-Marne in northern France as a reserve and to guard against a Prussian advance through Belgium.^[34]

A pre-war plan laid down by the late Marshal Niel called for a strong French offensive from Thionville towards Trier and into the Prussian Rhineland. This plan was discarded in favour of a defensive plan by Generals Charles Frossard and Bartélemy Lebrun, which called for the Army of the Rhine to remain in a defensive posture near the German border and repel any Prussian offensive. As Austria along with Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden were expected to join in a revenge war against Prussia, I Corps would invade the Bavarian Palatinate and proceed to 'free' the South German states in concert with Austro-Hungarian forces. VI Corps would reinforce either army as needed.^[35]

Unfortunately for Frossard's plan, the Prussian army mobilised far more rapidly than expected. The Austro-Hungarians, still reeling after their defeat by Prussia in the Austro-Prussian War, were treading carefully before stating that they would only side with France if the south Germans viewed the French positively. This did not materialize as the South German states had come to Prussia's aid and were mobilizing their armies against France.^[36]

Occupation of Saarbrücken[edit]

Napoleon III was under substantial domestic pressure to launch an offensive before the full might of Moltke's forces was mobilized and deployed. Reconnaissance by Frossard's forces had identified only the Prussian 16th Infantry Division guarding the border town of Saarbrücken, right before the entire Army of the Rhine. Accordingly, on 31 July the Army marched forward toward the Saar River to seize Saarbrücken.^[37]

General Frossard's II Corps and Marshal Bazaine's III Corps crossed the German border on 2 August, and began to force the Prussian 40th Regiment of the 16th Infantry Division from the town of Saarbrücken with a series of direct attacks. The Chassepot rifle proved its worth against the Dreyse rifle, with French riflemen regularly outdistancing their Prussian counterparts in the skirmishing around Saarbrücken. However the Prussians resisted strongly, and the French suffered 86 casualties to the Prussian 83 casualties. Saarbrücken also proved to be a major obstacle in terms of logistics. Only one railway there led to the German hinterland but could be easily defended by a single force, and the only river systems in the region ran along the border instead of inland.^[38] While the French hailed the invasion as the first step towards the Rhineland and later Berlin, General Le Bœuf and Napoleon III were receiving alarming reports from foreign news sources of Prussian and Bavarian armies massing to the southeast in addition to the forces to the north and northeast.^[39]

Moltke had indeed massed three armies in the area—the Prussian First Army with 50,000 men, commanded by General Karl von Steinmetz opposite Saarlouis, the Prussian Second Army with 134,000 men commanded by Prince Friedrich Karl opposite the line Forbach-Spicheren, and the Prussian Third Army with 120,000 men commanded by Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, poised to cross the border at Wissembourg.^[40]

Prussian Army advance[edit]

Battle of Wissembourg[edit]

Upon learning from captured Prussian soldiers and a local area police chief that the Prussian Crown Prince's Third Army was just 30 miles (48 km) north from Saarbrücken near the Rhine river town Wissembourg, General Le Bœuf and Napoleon III decided to retreat to defensive positions. General Frossard, without instructions, hastily withdrew his elements of the Army of the Rhine in Saarbrücken back across the river to Spicheren and Forbach.^[41]

Marshal MacMahon, now closest to Wissembourg, spread his four divisions 20 miles (32 km) to react to any Prussian-Bavarian invasion. This organization was due to a lack of supplies, forcing each division to seek out food and forage from the countryside and from the representatives of the army supply arm that was supposed to provision them. What made a bad situation much worse was the conduct of General Auguste-Alexandre Ducrot, commander of the 1st Division. He told General Abel Douay, commander of the 2nd Division, on 1 August that 'The information I have received makes me suppose that the enemy has no considerable forces very near his advance posts, and has no desire to take the offensive'.^[42] Two days later, he told MacMahon that he had not found 'a single enemy post .. it looks to me as if the menace of the Bavarians is simply bluff'. Even though Ducrot shrugged off the possibility of an attack by the Germans, MacMahon tried to warn his other three division commanders, without success.^[43]

The first action of the Franco-Prussian War took place on 4 August 1870. This battle saw the unsupported division of General Douay of I Corps, with some attached cavalry, which was posted to watch the border, attacked in overwhelming but uncoordinated fashion by the German 3rd Army. During the day, elements of a Bavarian and two Prussian corps became engaged and were aided by Prussian artillery, which blasted holes in the city defenses. Douay held a very strong position initially, thanks to the accurate long-range rapid fire of the Chassepot rifles, but his force was too thinly stretched to hold it. Douay was killed in the late morning when a caisson of the divisional mitrailleuse battery exploded near him; the encirclement of the town by the Prussians threatened the French avenue of retreat.^[44]

The fighting within the town had become extremely intense, becoming a door to door battle of survival. Despite an unceasing attack from Prussian infantry, the soldiers of the 2nd Division kept to their positions. The people of the town of Wissembourg finally surrendered to the Germans. The French troops who did not surrender retreated westward, leaving behind 1,000 dead and wounded and another 1,000 prisoners and all of their remaining ammunition.^[45] The final attack by the Prussian troops also cost c. 1,000 casualties. The German cavalry then failed to pursue the French and lost touch with them. The attackers had an initial superiority of numbers, a broad deployment which made envelopment highly likely but the effectiveness of French Chassepot rifle-fire inflicted costly repulses on infantry attacks, until the French infantry had been extensively bombarded by the Prussian artillery.^[46]

Battle of Spicheren[edit]

The Battle of Spicheren, on 5 August, was the second of three critical French defeats. Moltke had originally planned to keep Bazaine's army on the Saar River until he could attack it with the 2nd Army in front and the 1st Army on its left flank, while the 3rd Army closed towards the rear. The aging General von Steinmetz made an overzealous, unplanned move, leading the 1st Army south from his position on the Moselle. He moved straight toward the town of Spicheren, cutting off Prince Frederick Charles from his forward cavalry units in the process.^[47]

On the French side, planning after the disaster at Wissembourg had become essential. General Le Bœuf, flushed with anger, was intent upon going on the offensive over the Saar and countering their loss. However, planning for the next encounter was more based upon the reality of unfolding events rather than emotion or pride, as Intendant General Wolff told him and his staff that supply beyond the Saar would be impossible. Therefore, the armies of France would take up a defensive position that would protect against every possible attack point, but also left the armies unable to support each other.^[48]

While the French army under General MacMahon engaged the German 3rd Army at the Battle of Wörth, the German 1st Army under Steinmetz finished their advance west from Saarbrücken. A patrol from the German 2nd Army under Prince Friedrich Karl of Prussia spotted decoy fires close and Frossard's army farther off on a distant plateau south of the town of Spicheren, and took this as a sign of Frossard's retreat. Ignoring Moltke's plan again, both German armies attacked Frossard's French 2nd Corps, fortified between Spicheren and Forbach.^[49]

The French were unaware of German numerical superiority at the beginning of the battle as the German 2nd Army did not attack all at once. Treating the oncoming attacks as merely skirmishes, Frossard did not request additional support from other units. By the time he realized what kind of a force he was opposing, it was too late. Seriously flawed communications between Frossard and those in reserve under Bazaine slowed down so much that by the time the reserves received orders to move out to Spicheren, German soldiers from the 1st and 2nd armies had charged up the heights.^[50] Because the reserves had not arrived, Frossard erroneously believed that he was in grave danger of being outflanked as German soldiers under General von Glume were spotted in Forbach. Instead of continuing to defend the heights, by the close of battle after dusk he retreated to the south. The German casualties were relatively high due to the advance and the effectiveness of the Chassepot rifle. They were quite startled in the morning when they had found out that their efforts were not in vain—Frossard had abandoned his position on the heights.^[51]

Battle of Wörth[edit]

The Battle of Wörth (also known as Fröschwiller or Reichshoffen) began when the two armies clashed again on 6 August near Wörth in the town of Fröschwiller, about 10 miles (16 km) from Wissembourg. The Crown Prince of Prussia's 3rd army had, on the quick reaction of his Chief of Staff General von Blumenthal, drawn reinforcements which brought its strength up to 140,000 troops. The French had been slowly reinforced and their force numbered only 35,000. Although badly outnumbered, the French defended their position just outside Fröschwiller. By afternoon, the Germans had suffered c. 10,500 killed or wounded and the French had lost a similar number of casualties and another c. 9,200 men taken prisoner, a loss of about 50%. The Germans captured Fröschwiller which sat on a hilltop in the centre of the French line. Having lost any hope for victory and facing a massacre, the French army disengaged and retreated in a westerly direction towards Bitche and Saverne, hoping to join French forces on the other side of the Vosges mountains. The German 3rd army did not pursue the French but remained in Alsace and moved slowly south, attacking and destroying the French garrisons in the vicinity.^[52]

Battle of Mars-La-Tour[edit]

About 160,000 French soldiers were besieged in the fortress of Metz following the defeats on the frontier. A retirement from Metz to link up with French forces at Châlons was ordered on 15 August and spotted by a Prussian cavalry patrol under Major Oskar von Blumenthal. Next day a grossly outnumbered Prussian force of 30,000 men of III Corps (of the 2nd Army) under General Constantin von Alvensleben, found the French Army near Vionville, east of Mars-la-Tour.^[53]

Despite odds of four to one, the III Corps launched a risky attack. The French were routed and the III Corps captured Vionville, blocking any further escape attempts to the west. Once blocked from retreat, the French in the fortress of Metz had no choice but to engage in a fight that would see the last major cavalry engagement in Western Europe. The battle soon erupted, and III Corps was shattered by incessant cavalry charges, losing over half its soldiers. The German Official History recorded 15,780 casualties and French casualties of 13,761 men.^[54]

On 16 August, the French had a chance to sweep away the key Prussian defense, and to escape. Two Prussian corps had attacked the French advance guard, thinking that it was the rearguard of the retreat of the French Army of the Meuse. Despite this misjudgment the two Prussian corps held the entire French army for the whole day. Outnumbered 5 to 1, the extraordinary élan of the Prussians prevailed over gross indecision by the French. The French had lost the opportunity to win a decisive victory.^[55]

Battle of Gravelotte[edit]

The Battle of Gravelotte, or Gravelotte–St. Privat (18 August), was the largest battle during the Franco-Prussian War. It was fought about 6 miles (9.7 km) west of Metz, where on the previous day, having intercepted the French army's retreat to the west at the Battle of Mars-La-Tour, the Prussians were now closing in to complete the destruction of the French forces. The combined German forces, under Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke, were the Prussian First and Second Armies of the North German Confederation numbering about 210 infantry battalions, 133 cavalry squadrons, and 732 heavy cannons totaling 188,332 officers and men. The French Army of the Rhine, commanded by Marshal François-Achille Bazaine, numbering about 183 infantry battalions, 104 cavalry squadrons, backed by 520 heavy cannons, totaling 112,800 officers and men, dug in along high ground with their southern left flank at the town of Rozerieulles, and their northern right flank at St. Privat.

On 18 August, the battle began when at 08:00 Moltke ordered the First and Second Armies to advance against the French positions. The French were dug in with trenches and rifle pits with their artillery and their mitrailleuses in concealed positions. Backed by artillery fire, Steinmetz's VII and VIII Corps launched attacks across the Mance ravine, all of which were defeated by French rifle and mitrailleuse firepower, forcing the two German corps' to withdraw to Rezonville. The Prussian 1st Guards Infantry Division assaulted French-held St. Privat and was pinned down by French fire from rifle pits and trenches. The Second Army under Prince Frederick Charles used its artillery to pulverize the French position at St. Privat. His XII Corps took the town of Roncourt and helped the Guard conquer St. Privat, while Eduard von Fransecky's II Corps advanced across the Mance ravine. The fighting died down at 22:00.

The next morning the French Army of the Rhine retreated to Metz where they were besieged and forced to surrender two months later. A grand total of 20,163 German troops were killed, wounded or missing in action during the August 18 battle. The French losses were 7,855 killed and wounded along with 4,420 prisoners of war (half of them were wounded) for a total of 12,275.

Siege of Metz[edit]

With the defeat of Marshal Bazaine's Army of the Rhine at Gravelotte, the French were retired to Metz, where they were besieged by over 150,000 Prussian troops of the First and Second Armies. Napoleon III and MacMahon formed the new French Army of Châlons, to march on to Metz to rescue Bazaine. Napoleon III personally led the army with Marshal MacMahon in attendance. The Army of Châlons marched northeast towards the Belgian border to avoid the Prussians before striking south to link up with Bazaine. The Prussians, under the command of Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke, took advantage of this maneuver to catch the French in a pincer grip. He left the Prussian First and Second Armies besieging Metz, except three corps detached to form the Army of the Meuse under the Crown Prince of Saxony. With this army and the Prussian Third Army, Moltke marched northward and caught up with the French at Beaumont on 30 August. After a sharp fight in which they lost 5,000 men and 40 cannons, the French withdrew toward Sedan. Having reformed in the town, the Army of Châlons was immediately isolated by the converging Prussian armies. Napoleon III ordered the army to break out of the encirclement immediately. With MacMahon wounded on the previous day, General Auguste Ducrot took command of the French troops in the field.

Battle of Sedan[edit]

On 1 September 1870, the battle opened with the Army of Châlons, with 202 infantry battalions, 80 cavalry squadrons and 564 guns, attacking the surrounding Prussian Third and Meuse Armies totaling 222 infantry battalions, 186 cavalry squadrons and 774 guns. General De Wimpffen, the commander of the French V Corps in reserve, hoped to launch a combined infantry and cavalry attack against the Prussian XI Corps. But by 11:00, Prussian artillery took a toll on the French while more Prussian troops arrived on the battlefield. The French cavalry, commanded by General Margueritte, launched three desperate attacks on the nearby village of Floing where the Prussian XI Corps was concentrated. Margueritte was killed leading the very first charge and the two additional charges led to nothing but heavy losses. By the end of the day, with no hope of breaking out, Napoleon III called off the attacks. The French lost over 17,000 men, killed or wounded, with 21,000 captured. The Prussians reported their losses at 2,320 killed, 5,980 wounded and 700 captured or missing. By the next day, on 2 September, Napoleon III surrendered and was taken prisoner with 104,000 of his soldiers. It was an overwhelming victory for the Prussians, for they not only captured an entire French army, but the leader of France as well. The defeat of the French at Sedan had decided the war in Prussia's favour. One French army was now immobilised and besieged in the city of Metz, and no other forces stood on French ground to prevent a German invasion. Nevertheless, the war would continue.

War of the Government of National Defence[edit]

Government of National Defence[edit]

When the news arrived at Paris of the surrender at Sedan of Napoleon III and 80,000 men, the Second Empire was overthrown by a popular uprising in Paris, which forced the proclamation of a Provisional Government and a Third Republic by general Trochu, Favre and Gambetta at Paris on 4 September, the new government calling itself the Government of National Defence.^[56] After the German victory at Sedan, most of the French standing army was either besieged in Metz or prisoner of the Germans, who hoped for an armistice and an end to the war. Bismarck wanted an early peace but had difficulty in finding a legitimate French authority with which to negotiate. The Government of National Defence had no electoral mandate, the Emperor was a captive and the Empress in exile but there had been no abdication de jure and the army was still bound by an oath of allegiance to the defunct imperial régime.^[57]

The Germans expected to negotiate an end to the war but while the republican government was amenable to war reparations or ceding colonial territories in Africa or in South East Asia to Prussia, Favre on behalf of the Government of National Defense, declared on 6 September that France would not 'yield an inch of its territory nor a stone of its fortresses'.^[58] The republic then renewed the declaration of war, called for recruits in all parts of the country and pledged to drive the German troops out of France by a guerre à outrance.^[59] Under these circumstances, the Germans had to continue the war, yet could not pin down any proper military opposition in their vicinity. As the bulk of the remaining French armies were digging-in near Paris, the German leaders decided to put pressure upon the enemy by attacking Paris. By September 15, German troops reached the outskirts of Paris and Moltke issued the orders for an investment of the city. On September 19, the Germans surrounded it and erected a blockade, as already established at Metz, completing the encirclement on 20 September. Bismarck met Favre on 18 September at the Château de Ferrières and demanded a frontier immune to a French war of revenge, which included Strasbourg, Alsace and most of the Moselle department in Lorraine of which Metz was the capital. In return for an armistice for the French to elect a National Assembly, Bismarck demanded the surrender of Strasbourg and the fortress city of Toul. To allow supplies into Paris, one of the perimeter forts had to be handed over. Favre was unaware that the real aim of Bismarck in making such extortionate demands was to establish a durable peace on the new western frontier of Germany, preferably by a peace with a friendly government, on terms acceptable to French public opinion. An impregnable military frontier was an inferior alternative to him, favoured only by the militant nationalists on the German side.^[60]

When the war had begun, European public opinion heavily favoured the Germans; many Italians attempted to sign up as volunteers at the Prussian embassy in Florence and a Prussian diplomat visited Giuseppe Garibaldi in Caprera. Bismarck's demand that France surrender sovereignty over Alsace caused a dramatic shift in that sentiment in Italy, which was best exemplified by the reaction of Garibaldi soon after the revolution in Paris, who told the Movimento of Genoa on 7 September 1870 that 'Yesterday I said to you: war to the death to Bonaparte. Today I say to you: rescue the French Republic by every means.'^[61] Garibaldi went to France and assumed command of the Army of the Vosges, with which he operated around Dijon till the end of the war.

Siege of Paris[edit]

Prussian forces commenced the Siege of Paris on 19 September 1870. Faced with the blockade, the new French government called for the establishment of several large armies in the French provinces. These new bodies of troops were to march towards Paris and attack the Germans there from various directions at the same time. Armed French civilians were to create a guerilla force—the so-called Francs-tireurs—for the purpose of attacking German supply lines.

These developments prompted calls from the German public for a bombardment of the city. Von Blumenthal, who commanded the siege, was opposed to the bombardment on moral grounds. In this he was backed by other senior military figures such as the Crown Prince and Moltke.

Loire campaign[edit]

Dispatched from Paris as the republican government emissary, Léon Gambetta flew over the German lines in a balloon inflated with coal gas from the city's gasworks and organized the recruitment of the Armée de la Loire. Rumors about an alleged German 'extermination' plan infuriated the French and strengthened their support of the new regime. Within a few weeks, five new armies totalling more than 500,000 troops were recruited.^[62]

The Germans dispatched some of their troops to the French provinces to detect, attack and disperse the new French armies before they could become a menace. The Germans were not prepared for an occupation of the whole of France.

On 10 October, hostilities began between German and French republican forces near Orléans. At first, the Germans were victorious but the French drew reinforcements and defeated the Germans at the Battle of Coulmiers on 9 November. After the surrender of Metz, more than 100,000 well-trained and experienced German troops joined the German 'Southern Army'. The French were forced to abandon Orléans on 4 December, and were finally defeated at the Battle of Le Mans(10–12 January). A second French army which operated north of Paris was turned back at the Battle of Amiens (27 November), the Battle of Bapaume (3 January 1871) and the Battle of St. Quentin (13 January).^[63]

Northern campaign[edit]

Following the Army of the Loire's defeats, Gambetta turned to General Faidherbe's Army of the North.^[64] The army had achieved several small victories at towns such as Ham, La Hallue, and Amiens and was protected by the belt of fortresses in northern France, allowing Faidherbe's men to launch quick attacks against isolated Prussian units, then retreat behind the fortresses. Despite access to the armaments factories of Lille, the Army of the North suffered from severe supply difficulties, which depressed morale. In January 1871, Gambetta forced Faidherbe to march his army beyond the fortresses and engage the Prussians in open battle. The army was severely weakened by low morale, supply problems, the terrible winter weather and low troop quality, whilst general Faidherbe was unable to command due to his poor health, the result of decades of campaigning in West Africa. At the Battle of St. Quentin, the Army of the North suffered a crushing defeat and was scattered, releasing thousands of Prussian soldiers to be relocated to the East.^[65]

Eastern campaign[edit]

Following the destruction of the French Army of the Loire, remnants of the Loire army gathered in eastern France to form the Army of the East, commanded by general Charles-Denis Bourbaki. In a final attempt to cut the German supply lines in northeast France, Bourbaki's army marched north to attack the Prussian siege of Belfort and relieve the defenders.

In the battle of the Lisaine, Bourbaki's men failed to break through German lines commanded by General August von Werder. Bringing in the German 'Southern Army', General von Manteuffel then drove Bourbaki's army into the mountains near the Swiss border. Facing annihilation, the last intact French army crossed the border and was disarmed and interned by the neutral Swiss near Pontarlier (1 February).

Armistice[edit]

On 26 January 1871 the Government of National Defence based in Paris negotiated an armistice with the Prussians. With Paris starving, and Gambetta's provincial armies reeling from one disaster after another, French foreign minister Favre went to Versailles on 24 January to discuss peace terms with Bismarck. Bismarck agreed to end the siege and allow food convoys to immediately enter Paris (including trains carrying millions of German army rations), on condition that the Government of National Defence surrender several key fortresses outside Paris to the Prussians. Without the forts, the French Army would no longer be able to defend Paris.

Although public opinion in Paris was strongly against any form of surrender or concession to the Prussians, the Government realised that it could not hold the city for much longer, and that Gambetta's provincial armies would probably never break through to relieve Paris. President Trochu resigned on 25 January and was replaced by Favre, who signed the surrender two days later at Versailles, with the armistice coming into effect at midnight. Several sources claim that in his carriage on the way back to Paris, Favre broke into tears, and collapsed into his daughter's arms as the guns around Paris fell silent at midnight. At Bordeaux, Gambetta received word from Paris on 29 January that the Government had surrendered. Furious, he refused to surrender. Jules Simon, a member of the Government arrived from Paris by train on 1 February to negotiate with Gambetta. Another group of three ministers arrived in Bordeaux on 5 February and the following day Gambetta stepped down and surrendered control of the provincial armies to the Government of National Defence, which promptly ordered a cease-fire across France.

War at sea[edit]

Blockade[edit]

When the war began, the French government ordered a blockade of the North German coasts, which the small North German Federal Navy with only five ironclads and various minor vessels could do little to oppose. For most of the war, the three largest German ironclads were out of service with engine troubles; only the turret shipSMS Arminius was available to conduct operations. By the time engine repairs had been completed, the French fleet had already departed.^[67] The blockade proved only partially successful due to crucial oversights by the planners in Paris. Reservists that were supposed to be at the ready in case of war, were working in the Newfoundland fisheries or in Scotland. Only part of the 470-ship French Navy put to sea on 24 July. Before long, the French navy ran short of coal, needing 200 short tons (180 t) per day and having a bunker capacity in the fleet of only 250 short tons (230 t). A blockade of Wilhelmshaven failed and conflicting orders about operations in the Baltic Sea or a return to France, made the French naval efforts futile. Spotting a blockade-runner became unwelcome because of the question du charbon; pursuit of Prussian ships quickly depleted the coal reserves of the French ships.^[68][69]

To relieve pressure from the expected German attack into Alsace-Lorraine, Napoleon III and the French high command planned a seaborne invasion of northern Germany as soon as war began. The French expected the invasion to divert German troops and to encourage Denmark to join in the war, with its 50,000-strong army and the Royal Danish Navy. It was discovered that Prussia had recently built defences around the big North German ports, including coastal artillery batteries with Krupp heavy artillery, which with a range of 4,000 yards (3,700 m), had double the range of French naval guns. The French Navy lacked the heavy guns to engage the coastal defences and the topography of the Prussian coast made a seaborne invasion of northern Germany impossible.^[70]

The French Marines and naval infantry intended for the invasion of northern Germany were dispatched to reinforce the French Army of Châlons and fell into captivity at Sedan along with Napoleon III. A shortage of officers, following the capture of most of the professional French army at the Siege of Metz and at the Battle of Sedan, led naval officers to be sent from their ships to command hastily assembled reservists of the Garde Mobile.^[71] As the autumn storms of the North Sea forced the return of more of the French ships, the blockade of the north German ports diminished and in September 1870 the French navy abandoned the blockade for the winter. The rest of the navy retired to ports along the English Channel and remained in port for the rest of the war.^[71]

Pacific and Caribbean[edit]

Outside Europe, the French corvetteDupleix blockaded the German corvette SMS Hertha in Nagasaki and the Battle of Havana took place between the Prussian gunboat SMS Meteor and the French aviso Bouvet off Havana, Cuba, in November 1870.^[72][73]

Aftermath[edit]

Analysis[edit]

The quick German victory over the French stunned neutral observers, many of whom had expected a French victory and most of whom had expected a long war. The strategic advantages possessed by the Germans were not appreciated outside Germany until after hostilities had ceased. Other countries quickly discerned the advantages given to the Germans by their military system, and adopted many of their innovations, particularly the General Staff, universal conscription and highly detailed mobilization systems.^[74]

The Prussian General Staff developed by Moltke proved to be extremely effective, in contrast to the traditional French school. This was in large part due to the fact that the Prussian General Staff was created to study previous Prussian operations and learn to avoid mistakes. The structure also greatly strengthened Moltke's ability to control large formations spread out over significant distances.^[75] The Chief of the General Staff, effectively the commander in chief of the Prussian army, was independent of the minister of war and answered only to the monarch.^[76] The French General Staff—along with those of every other European military—was little better than a collection of assistants for the line commanders. This disorganization hampered the French commanders' ability to exercise control of their forces.^[77]

In addition, the Prussian military education system was superior to the French model; Prussian staff officers were trained to exhibit initiative and independent thinking. Indeed, this was Moltke's expectation.^[78] The French, meanwhile, suffered from an education and promotion system that stifled intellectual development. According to the military historian Dallas Irvine, the system 'was almost completely effective in excluding the army's brain power from the staff and high command. To the resulting lack of intelligence at the top can be ascribed all the inexcusable defects of French military policy.'^[76]

Albrecht von Roon, the Prussian Minister of War from 1859 to 1873, put into effect a series of reforms of the Prussian military system in the 1860s. Among these were two major reforms that substantially increased the military power of Germany. The first was a reorganization of the army that integrated the regular army and the Landwehr reserves.^[79] The second was the provision for the conscription of every male Prussian of military age in the event of mobilization.^[80] Thus, despite the population of France being greater than the population of all of the German states that participated in the war, the Germans mobilized more soldiers for battle.

At the start of the Franco-Prussian War, 462,000 German soldiers concentrated on the French frontier while only 270,000 French soldiers could be moved to face them, the French army having lost 100,000 stragglers before a shot was fired, through poor planning and administration.^[20] This was partly due to the peacetime organisations of the armies. Each Prussian Corps was based within a Kreis (literally 'circle') around the chief city in an area. Reservists rarely lived more than a day's travel from their regiment's depot. By contrast, French regiments generally served far from their depots, which in turn were not in the areas of France from which their soldiers were drawn. Reservists often faced several days' journey to report to their depots, and then another long journey to join their regiments. Large numbers of reservists choked railway stations, vainly seeking rations and orders.^[81]

The effect of these differences was accentuated by the peacetime preparations. The Prussian General Staff had drawn up minutely detailed mobilization plans using the railway system, which in turn had been partly laid out in response to recommendations of a Railway Section within the General Staff. The French railway system, with competing companies, had developed purely from commercial pressures and many journeys to the front in Alsace and Lorraine involved long diversions and frequent changes between trains. There was no system of military control of the railways and officers simply commandeered trains as they saw fit. Rail sidings and marshalling yards became choked with loaded wagons, with nobody responsible for unloading them or directing them to the destination.^[82]

Although Austria-Hungary and Denmark had both wished to avenge their recent military defeats against Prussia, they chose not to intervene in the war due to a lack of confidence in the French. Napoleon III also failed to cultivate alliances with the Russian Empire and the United Kingdom, partially due to the diplomatic efforts of the Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck, and thus faced the German states alone.

The French breech-loading rifle, the Chassepot, had a far longer range than the German needle gun; 1,500 yards (1,400 m) compared to 600 yd (550 m). The French also had an early machine-gun type weapon, the mitrailleuse, which could fire its thirty-seven barrels at a range of around 1,200 yd (1,100 m).^[83] It was developed in such secrecy that little training with the weapon had occurred, leaving French gunners with no experience; the gun was treated like artillery and in this role it was ineffective. Worse still, once the small number of soldiers who had been trained how to use the new weapon became casualties, there were no replacements who knew how to operate the mitrailleuse.^[84]

The French were equipped with bronze, rifled muzzle-loading artillery, while the Prussians used new steel breech-loading guns, which had a far longer range and a faster rate of fire.^[85] Prussian gunners strove for a high rate of fire, which was discouraged in the French army in the belief that it wasted ammunition. In addition, the Prussian artillery batteries had 30% more guns than their French counterparts. The Prussian guns typically opened fire at a range of 2–3 kilometres (1.2–1.9 mi), beyond the range of French artillery or the Chassepot rifle. The Prussian batteries could thus destroy French artillery with impunity, before being moved forward to directly support infantry attacks.^[86] The Germans fired 30,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and 362,662 field artillery rounds.^[87]

Effects on military thought[edit]

The events of the Franco-Prussian War had great influence on military thinking over the next forty years. Lessons drawn from the war included the need for a general staff system, the scale and duration of future wars and the tactical use of artillery and cavalry. The bold use of artillery by the Prussians, to silence French guns at long range and then to directly support infantry attacks at close range, proved to be superior to the defensive doctrine employed by French gunners. The Prussian tactics were adopted by European armies by 1914, exemplified in the French 75, an artillery piece optimised to provide direct fire support to advancing infantry. Most European armies ignored the evidence of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05 which suggested that infantry armed with new smokeless-powder rifles could engage gun crews effectively. This forced gunners to fire at longer range using indirect fire, usually from a position of cover.^[88] The heavy use of fortifications and dugouts in the Russo-Japanese war also greatly undermined the usefulness of Field Artillery which was not designed for indirect fire.

At the Battle of Mars-la-Tours, the Prussian 12th Cavalry Brigade, commanded by General Adalbert von Bredow, conducted a charge against a French artillery battery. The attack was a costly success and came to be known as 'von Bredow's Death Ride', which was held to prove that cavalry charges could still prevail on the battlefield. Use of traditional cavalry on the battlefields of 1914 proved to be disastrous, due to accurate, long-range rifle fire, machine-guns and artillery.^[89] Von Bredow's attack had succeeded only because of an unusually effective artillery bombardment just before the charge, along with favorable terrain that masked his approach.^[90][89]

Casualties[edit]

The Germans deployed a total of 33,101 officers and 1,113,254 men into France, of which they lost 1,046 officers and 16,539 enlisted men killed in action. Another 671 officers and 10,050 men died of their wounds, for total battle deaths of 28,306. Disease killed 207 officers and 11,940 men, with typhoid accounting for 6,965. 4,009 were missing and presumed dead; 290 died in accidents and 29 committed suicide. Among the missing and captured were 103 officers and 10,026 men. The wounded amounted to 3,725 officers and 86,007 men.^[4]

French battle deaths were 77,000, of which 41,000 were killed in action and 36,000 died of wounds. More than 45,000 died of sickness. Total deaths were 138,871, with 136,540 being suffered by the army and 2,331 by the navy. The wounded totaled 137,626; 131,000 for the army and 6,526 for the navy. French prisoners of war numbered 383,860. In addition, 90,192 French soldiers were interned in Switzerland and 6,300 in Belgium.^[4]

Subsequent events[edit]

Prussian reaction and withdrawal[edit]

The Prussian Army, under the terms of the armistice, held a brief victory parade in Paris on 17 February; the city was silent and draped with black and the Germans quickly withdrew. Bismarck honoured the armistice, by allowing train loads of food into Paris and withdrawing Prussian forces to the east of the city, prior to a full withdrawal once France agreed to pay a five billion franc war indemnity.^[91] The indemnity was proportioned, according to population, to be the exact equivalent to the indemnity imposed by Napoleon on Prussia in 1807.^[91] At the same time, Prussian forces were concentrated in the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. An exodus occurred from Paris as some 200,000 people, predominantly middle-class, went to the countryside.

Paris Commune[edit]

During the war, the Paris National Guard, particularly in the working-class neighbourhoods of Paris, had become highly politicised and units elected officers; many refused to wear uniforms or obey commands from the national government. National guard units tried to seize power in Paris on 31 October 1870 and 22 January 1871. On 18 March 1871, when the regular army tried to remove cannons from an artillery park on Montmartre, National Guard units resisted and killed two army generals. The national government and regular army forces retreated to Versailles and a revolutionary government was proclaimed in Paris. A commune was elected, which was dominated by socialists, anarchists and revolutionaries. The red flag replaced the French tricolour and a civil war began between the Commune and the regular army, which attacked and recaptured Paris from 21–28 May in the Semaine Sanglante (bloody week).^[92][93]

During the fighting, the Communards killed c. 500 people, including the Archbishop of Paris, and burned down many government buildings, including the Tuileries Palace and the Hotel de Ville.^[94] Communards captured with weapons were routinely shot by the army and Government troops killed between 7,000 and 30,000 Communards, both during the fighting and in massacres of men, women, and children during and after the Commune.^{[95][93][96][97]} More recent histories, based on studies of the number buried in Paris cemeteries and in mass graves after the fall of the Commune, put the number killed at between 6,000 and 10,000.^[98] Twenty-six courts were established to try more than 40,000 people who had been arrested, which took until 1875 and imposed 95 death sentences, of which 23 were inflicted. Forced labour for life was imposed on 251 people,1,160 people were transported to 'a fortified place' and 3,417 people were transported. About 20,000 Communards were held in prison hulks until released in 1872 and a great many Communards fled abroad to Britain, Switzerland, Belgium or the United States. The survivors were amnestied by a bill introduced by Gambetta in 1880 and allowed to return.^[99]

German unification and power[edit]

The creation of a unified German Empire greatly disturbed the balance of power that had been created with the Congress of Vienna after the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Germany had established itself as a major power in continental Europe, boasting the most powerful and professional army in the world.^[100] Although Britain remained the dominant world power overall, British involvement in European affairs during the late 19th century was limited, owing to its focus on colonial empire-building, allowing Germany to exercise great influence over the European mainland.^{[citation needed]} Anglo-German straining of tensions was somewhat mitigated by several prominent relationships between the two powers, such as the Crown Prince's marriage with the daughter of Queen Victoria.

French reaction and Revanchism[edit]

The defeat in the Franco-Prussian War led to the birth of Revanchism (literally, 'revenge-ism') in France, characterised by a deep sense of bitterness, hatred and demand for revenge against Germany. This was particularly manifested in the desire for another war with Germany in order to reclaim Alsace and Lorraine.^[101][102] It also led to the development of nationalist ideologies emphasising 'the ideal of the guarded, self-referential nation schooled in the imperative of war', an ideology epitomised by figures such as General Georges Ernest Boulanger in the 1880s.^[103] Paintings that emphasized the humiliation of the defeat became in high demand, such as those by Alphonse de Neuville.^[104]

See also[edit]

Footnotes[edit]

1. ^Clodfelter 2017, p. 184, 33,101 officers and 1,113,254 men were deployed into France. A further 348,057 officers and men were mobilized and stayed in Germany.
2. ^ ^abcdefClodfelter 2017, p. 184.
3. ^ ^abHoward 1991, p. 39.
4. ^ ^abcdClodfelter 2017, p. 187.
5. ^Clodfelter 2017, p. 187, of which 17,585 killed in action, 10,721 died of wounds, 12,147 died from disease, 290 died in accidents, 29 committed suicide and 4,009 were missing and presumed dead.
6. ^Nolte 1884, pp. 526–527.
7. ^Nolte 1884, p. 527.
8. ^Clodfelter 2017, p. 187, of which 41,000 killed in action, 36,000 died of wounds and 45,000 died from disease.
9. ^Ramm 1967, pp. 308–313, highlights three difficulties with the argument that Bismarck planned or provoked a French attack.
10. ^Howard 1991, p. 40.
11. ^ ^abHoward 1991, p. 45.
12. ^von Bismarck 1899, p. 58.
13. ^ ^abcBritannica: Franco-German War.
14. ^von Bismarck & von Poschinger 1900, p. 87.
15. ^Howard 1991, p. 41.
16. ^Wawro 2002, p. 101.
17. ^Milza 2009, p. 49.
18. ^Milza 2009, pp. 57-59.
19. ^McElwee 1974, p. 43.
20. ^ ^abMcElwee 1974, p. 46.
21. ^ ^abcWawro 2002, p. 102.
22. ^Wawro 2002, p. 103.
23. ^Howard 1991, p. 4.
24. ^Palmer 2010, p. 20.
25. ^Wawro 2002, p. 104.
26. ^Wawro 2002, p. 89.
27. ^Wawro 2002, p. 110.
28. ^Palmer 2010, p. 30.
29. ^Wawro 2002, p. 113.
30. ^Wawro 2003, p. 58.
31. ^Zabecki 2008, pp. 5–7.
32. ^Wawro 2003, p. 47.
33. ^Howard 1991, p. 78.
34. ^Howard 1991, pp. 69, 78–79.
35. ^Wawro 2003, pp. 66–67.
36. ^Howard 1991, pp. 47, 48, 60.
37. ^Wawro 2003, pp. 85, 86, 90.
38. ^Wawro 2003, pp. 87, 90.
39. ^Wawro 2003, p. 94.
40. ^Howard 1991, p. 82.
41. ^Wawro 2003, p. 95.
42. ^Howard 1991, pp. 100–101.
43. ^Howard 1991, p. 101.
44. ^Wawro 2003, pp. 97, 98, 101.
45. ^Wawro 2003, pp. 101–103.
46. ^Howard 1991, pp. 101–103.
47. ^Wawro 2003, p. 108.
48. ^Howard 1991, pp. 87–88.
49. ^Howard 1991, pp. 89–90.
50. ^Howard 1991, pp. 92–93.
51. ^Howard 1991, pp. 98–99.
52. ^Howard 1979, pp. 108–117.
53. ^Howard 1979, p. 145.
54. ^Howard 1979, pp. 152–161.
55. ^Howard 1979, pp. 160–163.
56. ^Baldick 1974, pp. 20–21.
57. ^Howard 1979, pp. 228–231.
58. ^Craig 1980, p. 31.
59. ^Howard 1979, p. 234.
60. ^Howard 1991, pp. 230–233.
61. ^Ridley 1976, p. 602.
62. ^Foley 2007, pp. 19–20.
63. ^Shann & Delperier 1991, p. 4.
64. ^Hozier & Davenport Adams 1872, p. 217ff.
65. ^Ollier 1883, p. 210.
66. ^de Chavannes 1872.
67. ^Sondhaus 2001, pp. 101–102.
68. ^Rüstow 1872, pp. 229–235.
69. ^Wawro 2003, p. 191.
70. ^Wawro 2003, pp. 190–192.
71. ^ ^abWawro 2003, p. 192.
72. ^von Pflugk-Harttung 1900, pp. 587–588.
73. ^Rüstow 1872, p. 243.
74. ^van Creveld 1977, p. 96.
75. ^Howard 1991, p. 23.
76. ^ ^abIrvine 1938, p. 192.
77. ^Howard 1991, pp. 23–24.
78. ^Holborn 1942, p. 159.
79. ^Howard 1991, pp. 19–20.
80. ^Howard 1991, p. 21.
81. ^Howard 1991, p. 68.
82. ^Howard 1991, pp. 70–71.
83. ^Wawro 2003, pp. 52–53.
84. ^Bailey 2004, p. 217.
85. ^Howard 1991, pp. 35–36.
86. ^Bailey 2004, pp. 216–217.
87. ^German General Staff 1884, p. 195.
88. ^Bailey 2004, pp. 218–219.
89. ^ ^abHoward 1979, pp. 156–157.
90. ^Bailey 2004, p. 218.
91. ^ ^abTaylor 1955, p. 133.
92. ^Wawro 2003, pp. 301, 310.
93. ^ ^abBaldick 1974, p. 209.
94. ^Horne 1965, p. 416.
95. ^Rougerie 1995, p. 118.
96. ^Wawro 2000, p. 122.
97. ^Wawro 2003, p. 301.
98. ^Rougerie 2014, p. 118.
99. ^Horne 1965, pp. 422–424.
100. ^Kennedy 1987.
101. ^Varley 2008a, pp. 62–80.
102. ^Varley 2008b.
103. ^Brown 2010.
104. ^Jay 1984, pp. 151–162.

References[edit]

Books[edit]

• Bailey, Jonathan B. A. (2004). Field Artillery and Firepower (Revised and expanded ed.). Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN978-1-59114-029-0.
• Baldick, Robert (1974). The Siege of Paris. London: London New English Library. ISBN978-0-450-02190-9.
• Brown, Frederick (2010). For the Soul of France: Culture wars in the age of Dreyfus. New York: Knopf. ISBN978-0-307-26631-6.
• Clodfelter, Micheal (2017). Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492-2015 (4th ed.). Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland. ISBN978-0-7864-7470-7.
• Craig, G. A. (1980). Germany: 1866–1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-19-502724-2.
• Foley, Robert T. (2007). German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870–1916 (pbk. ed.). Cambridge: CUP. ISBN978-0-521-04436-3.
• German General Staff (1884). The Franco-German War 1870-71: Part 2; Volume 3. Translated by Clarke, F.C.H. London: Clowes & Sons.
• Horne, Alistair (1965). The Fall of Paris; The siege and the Commune 1870-71. London: Macmillan. OCLC490599556.
• Howard, Michael (1979) [1961]. The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France 1870–1871. London: Rupert Hart-Davis. ISBN978-0-246-63587-7.
• Howard, Michael (1991) [1961]. The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France 1870–1871. New York: Routledge. ISBN978-0-415-02787-8.
• Hozier, Henry Montague; Davenport Adams, W. H. (1872). The Franco-Prussian War: Its Causes, Incidents, and Consequences. 2. London: William Mackenzie. OCLC931716547.
• Kennedy, Paul M. (1987). The rise and fall of the great powers : economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000 (1st ed.). New York: Random House. ISBN978-0-394-54674-2.
• McElwee, William Lloyd (1974). The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ISBN978-0-253-20214-7.
• Milza, Pierre (2009). L'Année terrible. 1: La Guerre franco-prussienne, septembre 1870 - mars 1871. Paris: Perrin. ISBN978-2-26202498-7.
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• Palmer, Michael A. (2010). The German Wars: A Concise History, 1859–1945. Minneapolis: MBI Pub. Co. and Zenith Press. ISBN978-1-61673-985-0.
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• Ridley, Jasper (1976) [1974]. Garibaldi. New York: Viking Press. ISBN978-0-670-33548-0.
• Rougerie, Jacques (1995). Paris Insurgé: La Commune de 1871. Paris: Gallimard. ISBN978-2-07053289-6.
• Rougerie, Jacques (2014). La Commune de 1871. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ISBN978-2-13-062078-5.
• Rüstow, W. (1872). The War for the Rhine Frontier, 1870: Its Political and Military History. 3. Translated by Needham, John Layland. Edinburgh: Blackwood. OCLC13591954.
• Shann, Stephen; Delperier, Louis (1991). French Army 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War. Men-at-Arms. 2 Republican Troops. Illustrated by Richard and Christa Hook. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN978-1-85532-135-9.
• Sondhaus, Lawrence (2001). Naval Warfare, 1815–1914. London: Routledge. ISBN978-0-415-21478-0.
• Taylor, A. J. P. (1955). Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman. London: Hamish Hamilton. OCLC867374488.
• van Creveld, Martin (1977). Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (1st ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN978-0-521-29793-6.
• Varley, Karine (2008a). 'The Taboos of Defeat: Unmentionable Memories of the Franco-Prussian War in France, 1870–1914'. In Macleod, Jenny (ed.). Defeat and Memory: Cultural Histories of Military Defeat in the Modern Era. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN978-0-230-51740-0.
• Varley, Karine (2008b). Under the shadow of defeat : the war of 1870-71 in French memory. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN978-0-230-00519-8.
• von Bismarck, Otto Eduard Leopold (1899). Bismarck: The Man & The Statesman. Translated by Butler, Arthur John. New York: Harper & Brothers. OCLC51415680.
• von Bismarck, Otto Eduard Leopold; von Poschinger, Heinrich (1900). von Poschinger, Heinrich; Whitman, Sidney (eds.). Conversations with Prince Bismarck. Translated by Whitman, Sidney (English ed.). London: Harper & Brothers. OCLC222059904.
• von Pflugk-Harttung, Julius Albert Georg (1900). The Franco-German War, 1870–71. Translated by Maurice, J. F.; Long, Wilfred James; Sonnenschein, A. London: S. Sonnenschein and Co. OCLC3132807.
• Wawro, Geoffrey (2002). Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792–1914. New York: Routledge. ISBN978-0-203-17183-7.
• Wawro, Geoffrey (2000). Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792–1914. London: Routledge. ISBN978-0-415-21445-2.
• Wawro, Geoffrey (2003). The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN978-0-521-58436-4.
• Zabecki, David T. (2008). Chief of Staff. 1: Napoleonic wars to World War I. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN978-1-59114-990-3.

Journals[edit]

• Holborn, H. (1942). 'Moltke's Strategical Concepts'. Military Affairs. VI (3): 153–168. doi:10.2307/1982846. ISSN2325-6990. JSTOR1982846.
• Irvine, D. D. (1938). 'The French and Prussian Staff Systems Before 1870'. The Journal of the American Military History Foundation. 2 (4): 192–203. ISSN2326-6120. JSTOR3038792.
• Jay, Robert (1984). 'Alphonse de Neuville's 'The Spy' and the Legacy of the Franco-Prussian War'. Metropolitan Museum Journal. 19/20: 151–162. JSTOR1512817.

Websites[edit]

• de Chavannes, Puvis (1872). 'Hope'. The Walters Art Museum.
• 'Franco-German War'. Britannica.com. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. 30 December 2013. Retrieved 18 May 2013.

Further reading[edit]

Books[edit]

• Arand, Tobias (2018). 1870/71 die Geschichte des Deutsch-Französischen Krieges erzählt in Einzelschicksalen (in German). Hamburg: Osburg Verlag GmbH. ISBN978-3-95510167-1.
• Ascoli, David (2001). A day of Battle; Mars-La-Tour 16 August 1870. Edinburgh: Birlinn. ISBN978-1-84158-121-7.
• Audoin-Rouzeau, Stéphane (1989). 1870 : la France dans la guerre (in French). Paris: Armand Colin. ISBN978-2-20037-165-4.
• Baumont, Maurice (1956). Gloires et tragédies de la IIIe République. Histoire de France Hachette. (in French). París: Hachette. OCLC40712256.
• Bresler, Fenton (1999). Napoleon III: A Life. New York, NY: Carroll & Graf. ISBN978-0-7867-0660-0.
• Bucholz, Arden (2001). Moltke and the German wars, 1864-1871. Basingstoke: Palgrave. ISBN978-0-333-68758-1.
• Clark, Christopher M. (2006). Iron Kingdom: The Rise And Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ISBN978-0-674-02385-7.
• De Cesare, Raffaele (1909). The Last Days of Papal Rome 1850–1870. Translated by Zimmern, Helen. London: Archibald Constable & Co. OCLC565258394.
• Fontane, Theodor (2010) [1873]. Der Krieg gegen Frankreich 1870-1871 (in German). 1. Bad Langensalza: Rockstuhl. ISBN978-3-937135-25-0.
• Helmert, Heinz; Usczeck, Hansjürgen (1967). Preussischdeutsche Kriege von 1864 bis 1871. Militärischer Verlauf. Kleine Militärgeschichte., Kriege. (in German). Berlin: Deutscher Militärverlag. OCLC4322242.
• Jerrold, William Blanchard (1874). The Life of Napoleon III. I. London: Longmans, Green & Co. OCLC717506637.
• Jerrold, William Blanchard (1875). The Life of Napoleon III. II. London: Longmans, Green & Co. OCLC867960419.
• Jerrold, William Blanchard (1877). The Life of Napoleon III. III. London: Longmans, Green & Co. OCLC832069805.
• Jerrold, William Blanchard (1882). The Life of Napoleon III. IV. London: Longmans, Green & Co. OCLC832069819.
• Kropotkin, Pyotr Alexeyevich (1891). The Commune of Paris. Freedom Pamphlets. 2. London: New Fellowship Press. OCLC620450578.
• Lowe, William J. (1999). The Nest in the Altar or Reminiscences of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. London: Chapter Two. ISBN978-1-85307-123-2.
• Lowe, John (2013). The Great Powers, Imperialism and the German Problem 1865–1925. Hoboken NY: Florence Taylor and Francis. ISBN978-1-136-15228-3.
• McCabe, James D. (1871). History of the War Between Germany and France. Philadelphia, PA: National Publishing Company, and Jones Brothers and Company. OCLC1032848707.
• Mehrkens, Heidi (2008). Statuswechsel : Kriegserfahrung und nationale Wahrnehmung im Deutsch-Französischen Krieg 1870/71. Schriften der Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte, (in German). Essen: Klartext. ISBN978-3-89861-565-5.
• Milza, Pierre (2004). Napoleon III. Paris: Editions Perrin. ISBN978-2-262-02607-3.
• Milza, Pierre (2009). L'Année terrible. 2: La commune mars - juin 1871. Paris: Perrin. ISBN978-2-262-03073-5.
• Nolte, Frédérick (1884). L'Europe militaire et diplomatique au dix-neuvième siècle, 1815–1884 (4 volumes) (in French). Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie. OCLC4899575.
• Robertson, Charles Grant (1969). Bismark. New York, NY: H. Fertig. OCLC560259585.
• Séguin, Philippe (1996). Louis Napoléon Le Grand. Paris: Grasset. ISBN978-2-246-42951-7.
• Shann, Stephen; Delperier, Louis (1991). French Army 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War. Men-at-Arms. 1 Imperial Troops. Illustrated by Jeffrey Burn. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN978-1-85532-121-2.
• Showalter, Dennis E. (2015). The wars of German unification. Modern Wars (2 ed.). London: Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN978-1-78093-808-0.
• Stoneman, Mark R (2008). 'Die deutschen Greueltaten im Krieg 1870/71 am Beispiel der Bayern'. In Neitzel, Sönke; Daniel Hohrath (eds.). Kriegsgreuel: Die Entgrenzung der Gewalt in kriegerischen Konflikten vom Mittelalter bis ins 20. Jahrhundert (in German). Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh. ISBN978-3-50676-375-4.
• Sumner, Charles (1870). The Duel Between France and Germany. Boston: Wright and Potter. OCLC1042896456.
• Taithe, Bertrand (2001). Citizenship and Wars: France in Turmoil 1870–1871. London: Routledge. ISBN978-0-415-23927-1.
• von Moltke, Helmuth (1992). Förster, Stig (ed.). Moltke : von Kabinettskrieg zum Volkskrieg : eine Werkauswahl (in German). Bonn: Bouvier Verlag. ISBN978-3-41680-655-8.
• von Moltke, Helmuth (1995). Hughes, Daniel J. (ed.). Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings. Translated by Hughes, Daniel J.; Bell, Harry. Novato, CA: Presidio Press. ISBN978-0-891414-84-1.
• von Moltke, Helmuth (1892). The Franco-German war of 1870-71. Translated by Bell, Clara; Fischer, Henry W. New York, NY: Harper & Brothers. OCLC758996861.
• von Moltke, Helmuth (1992). The Franco-German war of 1870-71. Translated by Forbes, Archibald. London: Greenhill Books. ISBN978-1-85367-131-9.
• Wetzel, David (2012). A Duel of Nations: Germany, France, and the diplomacy of the War of 1870-1871. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press. ISBN978-0-299-29133-4.

Caricatures and editorial cartoons[edit]

• Daniels, Morna (2005). 'Caricatures from the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and the Paris Commune'(PDF). British Library. Retrieved 28 November 2018.
• Kerziouk, Olga (23 June 2014). 'Napoleon III meets his nemesis: caricatures from the Franco-Prussian War'. British Library. Retrieved 16 October 2018.
• Pullen, Henry William (1871). The Fight at Dame Europa's School (Pamphlet). Illustrated by Thomas Nast. New York: Francis B. Felt. OCLC504021110 – via Wikisource.

External links[edit]

• ‹See Tfd›(in French)La guerre de 1870–71 en images

The Serbian campaign of World War I was fought from late July 1914, when Austria-Hungary invaded the Kingdom of Serbia at the outset of World War I, until the war's conclusion in November 1918. The front ranged from the Danube River to southern Macedonia and back north again, and it drew in forces from almost all the combatants of the war.After the disintegration of Austria-Hungary, the conflict ended with Allied and Serbian victory, and Serbian troops were able to re-enter Belgrade on 1 November 1918.^[13]

The Serbian Army declined severely towards the end of the war, falling from about 420,000^[2] at its peak to about 100,000 at the moment of liberation. The estimates of casualties are various: the Serb sources claim that the Kingdom of Serbia lost more than 1,200,000 inhabitants during the war (both army and civilian losses), which represented over 29% of its overall population and 60% of its male population,^[14][15] while western historians put the number either at 45,000 military deaths and 650,000 civilian deaths^[16] or 127,355 military deaths and 82,000 civilian deaths.^[17] According to estimates prepared by the Yugoslav government in 1924, Serbia lost 265,164 soldiers, or 25% of all mobilized people. By comparison, France lost 16.8%, Germany 15.4%, Russia 11.5%, and Italy 10.3%.

• 2Military forces
• 51914
• 61915
• 9Casualties

Background[edit]

Austria-Hungary precipitated the Bosnian crisis of 1908–09 by annexing the former Ottoman territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which it had occupied since 1878. This angered the Kingdom of Serbia and its patron, the Pan-Slavic and OrthodoxRussian Empire.^[18] Russian political manoeuvring in the region destabilised peace accords that were already unravelling in what was known as 'the powder keg of Europe'.^[18]

In 1912 and 1913, the First Balkan War was fought between the Balkan League of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro and the fracturing Ottoman Empire. The resulting Treaty of London further shrank the Ottoman Empire by creating an independent Principality of Albania and enlarging the territorial holdings of Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece. When Bulgaria attacked both Serbia and Greece on 16 June 1913, it lost most of its Macedonian region to those countries, and additionally the Southern Dobruja region to Romania and Adrianople (the present-day city of Edirne) to Turkey in the 33-day Second Balkan War, which further destabilized the region.^[19]

On 28 June 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb student and member of a multi-ethnic organisation of national revolutionaries called Young Bosnia, assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, in Sarajevo, Bosnia.^[20]The political objective of the assassination was the independence of the southern Austro-Hungarian provinces mainly populated by Slavs from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, though it also inadvertently triggered a chain of events that embroiled Russia and the major European powers. This began a period of diplomatic manoeuvring among Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, and Britain called the July Crisis. Austria-Hungary delivered the July Ultimatum to Serbia, a series of ten demands intentionally made unacceptable in order to provoke a war with Serbia.^[21] When Serbia agreed to only eight of the ten demands, Austria-Hungary declared war on 28 July 1914.

The dispute between Austria-Hungary and Serbia escalated into what is now known as World War I, and drew in Russia, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Within a week, Austria-Hungary had to face a war with Russia, Serbia's patron, which had the largest army in the world at the time. The result was that Serbia became a subsidiary front in the massive fight that started to unfold along Austria-Hungary's border with Russia. Serbia had an experienced army, but it was also exhausted from the conflicts of the Balkan Wars and poorly equipped, which led the Austro-Hungarians to believe that it would fall in less than a month. Serbia's strategy was to hold on as long as it could and hope the Russians could defeat the main Austro-Hungarian Army, with or without the help of other allies. Serbia constantly had to worry about its hostile neighbor to the east, Bulgaria, with which it had fought several wars, most recently in the Second Balkan War of 1913.

Military forces[edit]

Austro-Hungarian[edit]

The standing peacetime Austro-Hungarian army had some 36,000 officers and non-commissioned officers and 414,000 soldiers. During the mobilization, this number was increased to a total of 3,350,000 men of all ranks. The operational army had over 1,420,000 men, and a further 600,000 were allocated to support and logistic units (train, munition and supply columns, etc.) while the rest – around 1,350,000 – were reserve troops available for replacing losses and the formation of new units.^[22] This vast manpower allowed the Austro-Hungarian army to replace its losses regularly and keep units at their formation strength. According to some sources, during 1914 there were on average 150,000 men per month sent to replace the losses in the field army. During 1915 these numbers rose to 200,000 per month.^{[23][unreliable source?][better source needed]} According to the official Austrian documents in the period from September until the end of December 1914, some 160,000 replacement troops were sent to the Balkan theater of war, as well as 82,000 reinforcements as part of newly formed units.^{[24][unreliable source?]}

The pre-war Austro-Hungarian plan for invasion of Serbia envisioned the concentration of three armies (2nd, 5th and 6th) on the western and northern borders of Serbia with the main goal of enveloping and destroying the bulk of the Serbian army. However, with the beginning of the Russian general mobilization, Armeeoberkommando (AOK, Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command) decided to move the 2nd Army to Galicia to counter Russian forces. Due to the congestion of railroad lines towards Galicia, the 2nd Army could only start its departure on 18 August, which allowed AOK to assign some units of the 2nd Army to take part in operations in Serbia before that date. Eventually, AOK allowed General Oskar Potiorek to deploy a significant part of the 2nd Army (around four divisions) in fighting against Serbia, which caused a delay of transport of these troops to the Russian front for more than a week. Furthermore, the Austro-Hungarian defeats suffered during the first invasion of Serbia forced AOK to transfer two divisions from the 2nd Army permanently to Potiorek's force. By 12 August, Austria-Hungary had amassed over 500,000 soldiers on Serbian frontiers, including some 380,000 operational troops. With the departure of the major part of the 2nd Army to the Russian front, this number fell to some 285,000 of operational troops, including garrisons.^[25] Apart from land forces, Austria-Hungary also deployed its Danube River flotilla of six monitors and six patrol boats.

Many Austro-Hungarian soldiers were not of good quality.^[26] About one-quarter of them were illiterate, and most of the conscripts from the empire's subject nationalities did not speak or understand German or Hungarian. In addition to this, most of the soldiers — ethnic Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Romanians and South Slavs — had linguistic and cultural links with Austro-Hungarian empire's various enemies.^[27]

Serbian[edit]

The Serbian military command issued orders for the mobilization of its armed forces on 25 July and the mobilization began the following day, 26 July. By 30 July, the mobilization was completed and the troops began to be deployed according to the war plan. Deployments were completed by 9 August, when all of the troops had arrived at their designated strategic positions. During mobilization, Serbia raised approximately 450,000 men of three age-defined classes or bans called poziv, which comprised all able-bodied men between 21 and 45 years of age.

The operational army consisted of 11 and 1/2 infantry (six of 1st and five of the 2nd ban) and 1 cavalry division. Aged men of the 3rd ban were organized in 15 infantry regiments with some 45-50,000 men designated for use in rear and line of communications duties, however some of them were by necessity used as part of operational army as well, bringing its strength up to around 250,000 men.^[28] Serbia was in a much more disadvantageous position when compared with Austria-Hungary with regard to human reserves and replacement troops, as its only source of replacements were new recruits reaching the age of military enlistment. Their maximum annual number was theoretically around 60,000, which was insufficient to replace the losses of more than 132,000 sustained during operations from August to December 1914. This shortage of manpower forced the Serbian army to recruit under- and over-aged men to make up for losses in the opening phase of the war.

Because of the poor financial state of the Serbian economy and losses in the recent Balkan Wars, the Serbian army lacked much of the modern weaponry and equipment necessary to engage in combat with their larger and wealthier adversaries. There were only 180,000 modern rifles available for the operational army, which meant that the Serbian Army lacked between one-quarter to one-third of the rifles necessary to fully equip even their front line units, let alone reserve forces.^[29] Although Serbia tried to remedy this deficit by ordering 120,000 rifles from Russia in 1914, the weapons did not begin to arrive until the second half of August. Only 1st ban troops had complete grey-green M1908 uniforms, 2nd ban troops often wore the obsolete dark blue M1896 issue while the 3rd ban had no proper uniforms at all and were reduced to wearing their civilian clothes with military greatcoats and caps.^[30] The Serbian troops did not have service issued boots at all, and the vast majority of them wore everyday footwear made of pig skin called opanak.

Ammunition reserves were also insufficient for sustained field operations as most of it had been used in the 1912–13 Balkan wars. Artillery ammunition was sparse and only amounted to several hundred shells per unit. Because Serbia lacked a significant domestic military-industrial complex, its army was completely dependent on imports of ammunition and arms from France and Russia, which themselves were chronically short of supplies. The inevitable shortages of ammunition, which later would include a complete lack of artillery ammunition, reached their peak during decisive moments of the Austro-Hungarian invasion.

Comparative strength[edit]

These figures detail the number of all Austro-Hungarian troops concentrated on the southern (Serbian) theater of war at the beginning of August 1914 and the resources of the entire Serbian army (the number of troops actually available for the operations on both sides was however somewhat less):

Serbia's ally Montenegro mustered an army of some 45-50,000 men, with only 14 modern quick firing field guns, 62 machine guns and some 51 older pieces (some of them antique models from the 1870s). Unlike the Austro-Hungarian and the Serbian armies, the Montenegrin army was a militia type without proper military training or a career officer's corps.

note:

according to AH military formation^[31] average war strength of following units was:

Battalion:1000 (combatants)

Battery: 196

Squadron: 180

Engineer Companies: 260

Strength of corresponding Serbian units was similar:

Battalion: 1116 (combatants and non-combatants)

Battery: 169

Squadron: 130

Engineer Company: 250

Heavy artillery

Order of battle of the Serbian army[edit]

• First Army, commanded by general Petar Bojović; Chief of Staff colonel Božidar Terzić.
  • Cavalry division, four regiments, colonel Branko Jovanović
  • Timok I division, four regiments, general Vladimir Kondić
  • Timok II division, three regiments
  • Morava II division, three regiments
  • Danube II division (Braničevo detachment), six regiments
  • Army artillery, colonel Božidar Srećković
• Second Army, commanded by general Stepa Stepanović; Chief of Staff colonel Vojislav Živanović
  • Morava I division, colonel Ilija Gojković, four regiments
  • Combined I division, general Mihajlo Rašić, four regiments, regiment commanders Svetislav Mišković, X, X and Dragoljub Uzunmirković
  • Šumadija I division, four regiments
  • Danube I division, colonel Milivoje Anđelković, four regiments
  • Army artillery, colonel Vojislav Milojević
• Third Army, commanded by general Pavle Jurišić Šturm; Chief of Staff colonel Dušan Pešić
  • Drina I division, four regiments
  • Drina II division, four regiments, regiment commanders Miloje Jelisijević, X, X and X
  • Obrenovac detachment, one regiment, two battalions
  • Jadar Chetnik detachment
  • Army artillery, colonel Miloš Mihailović
• Užice Army, commanded by general Miloš Božanović
  • Šumadija II division, colonel Dragutin Milutinović, four regiments
  • Užice brigade, colonel Ivan Pavlović, two regiments
  • Chetnik detachments, Lim, Zlatibor, Gornjak detachments
  • Army artillery

Order of battle of the Austro-Hungarian army[edit]

August 1914:

• Balkan force
  • 5th Army, commanded by Liborius Ritter von Frank
    • 9. infantry division
    • 21. landwehr infantry division
    • 36. infantry division
    • 13. infantry brigade
    • 11. mountain brigade
    • 104. landsturm infantry brigade
    • 13. march brigade
  • 6th Army, commanded by Oskar Potiorek
    • 1. infantry division
    • 48. infantry division
    • 18. infantry division
    • 47. infantry division
    • 40. honved infantry division
    • 109. landsturm infantry brigade
  • Banat Rayon and garrisons
    • 107. landsturm infantry brigade
    • sundry units of infantry, cavalry and artillery
• Parts of the 2nd Army, commanded by Eduard von Böhm-Ermolli
  • 17. infantry division
  • 34. infantry division
  • 31. infantry division
  • 32. infantry division
  • 29. infantry division
  • 7. infantry division
  • 23.infantry division
  • 10. cavalry division
  • 4. march brigade
  • 7. march brigade
  • 8. march brigade

1914[edit]

The Serbian campaign started on 28 July 1914, when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia and her artillery shelled Belgrade the following day.^[32] On August 12 the Austro-Hungarian armies crossed the border, the Drina River (see map).

Initially, three out of six Austro-Hungarian armies were mobilized at the Serbian frontier, but due to Russian intervention, the 2nd Army was redirected east to the Galician theater. However, since the railroad lines leading to Galicia were busy with transport of other troops, the 2nd Army could only start its departure northward on 18 August. In order to make use of the temporary presence of the 2nd army, AOK allowed parts of it to be used in Serbian campaign until that date. Eventually, AOK directed significant parts of the 2nd Army (around 4 divisions) to assist general Potiorek's main force and postponed their transportation to Russia until the last week of August. Defeats suffered in the first invasion of Serbia eventually forced AOK to transfer 2 divisions from 2nd Army to Potiorek's army permanently.

The V and VI Austro-Hungarian Armies had about 270,000 men who were much better equipped than the Serbs. Overall, Austro-Hungarian command was in the hands of general Potiorek. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had the third largest population in Europe in 1914, behind Russia and Germany (almost twelve times the population of the Kingdom of Serbia), giving it an enormous manpower advantage.

Battle of Cer[edit]

Potiorek rushed the attack against Serbia from northern Bosnia with his Fifth Army, supported by elements of the Second Army from Syrmia. The Second Army was due to be transported to Galicia to face the Russians at the end of August, but he made use of it until then. The Sixth was positioning itself in southern Bosnia and was not yet able to commence offensive operations. Potiorek's desire was to win a victory before Emperor Franz Joseph's birthday and to knock Serbia out as soon as possible. Thus he made two grave strategic errors by attacking with only just over half of his strength and attacking hilly western Serbia instead of the open plains of the north. This move surprised Marshal Putnik, who expected attack from the north and initially believed that it was a feint. Once it became clear that it was the main thrust, the strong Second Army under the command of General Stepa Stepanović was sent to join the small Third Army under Pavle Jurišić Šturm already facing the Austro-Hungarians and expel the invaders. After a fierce four-day battle, the Austro-Hungarians were forced to retreat, marking the first Allied victory of the war over the Central Powers led by Germany and Austria-Hungary. Casualties numbered 23,000 for the Austro-Hungarians (of whom 4,500 were captured) and 16,500 for the Serbs.

Battle of Drina[edit]

Under pressure from its allies, Serbia conducted a limited offensive across the Sava river into the Austro-Hungarian region of Syrmia with its Serbian First Army. The main operational goal was to delay the transport of the Austro-Hungarian Second Army to the Russian front. The objective was shown to be futile as forces of the Second Army were already in transport. Meanwhile, the Timok division I of the Serbian Second Army suffered a heavy defeat in a diversionary crossing, suffering around 6,000 casualties while inflicting only 2,000.

With most of his forces in Bosnia, Potiorek decided that the best way to stop the Serbian offensive was to launch another invasion into Serbia to force the Serbs to recall their troops to defend their much smaller homeland.

Winston Churchill, The Great War.^[33]

7 September brought a renewed Austro-Hungarian attack from the west, across the river Drina, this time with both the Fifth Army in Mačva and the Sixth further south.^[34] The initial attack by the Fifth Army was repelled by the Serbian Second Army, with 4,000 Austro-Hungarian casualties, but the stronger Sixth Army managed to surprise the Serbian Third Army and gain a foothold. After some units from the Serbian Second Army were sent to bolster the Third, the Austro-Hungarian Fifth Army also managed to establish a bridgehead with a renewed attack. At that time, Marshal Putnik withdrew the First Army from Syrmia (against much popular opposition) and used it to deliver a fierce counterattack against the Sixth Army that initially went well, but finally bogged down in a bloody four-day fight for a peak of the Jagodnja mountain called Mačkov Kamen, in which both sides suffered horrendous losses in successive frontal attacks and counterattacks. Two Serbian divisions lost around 11,000 men, while Austro-Hungarian losses were probably comparable.

Men Of War Totaler Krieg 1939-45 Mod

Marshal Putnik ordered a retreat into the surrounding hills and the front settled into a month and a half of trench warfare, which was highly unfavourable to the Serbs, who had little in the way of an industrial base and were deficient in heavy artillery, ammunition stocks, shell production and footwear, since the vast majority of infantry wore the traditional (though state-issued) opanaks,^[26] while the Austro-Hungarians had waterproof leather boots. Most of their war material was supplied by the Allies, who were short of such materials themselves. In such a situation, Serbian artillery quickly became almost silent, while the Austro-Hungarians steadily increased their fire. Serbian casualties reached 100 soldiers a day from all causes in some divisions.

During the first weeks of trench warfare, the Serbian Užice Army (first strengthened division) and the Montenegrin Sanjak Army (roughly a division) conducted an abortive offensive into Bosnia. In addition, both sides conducted a few local attacks, most of which were soundly defeated. In one such attack, the Serbian Army used mine warfare for the first time: the Combined Division dug tunnels beneath the Austro-Hungarian trenches (that were only 20–30 meters away from the Serbian ones on this sector), planted mines and set them off just before an infantry charge.

Battle of Kolubara[edit]

Having thus weakened the Serbian army, the Austro-Hungarian Army launched another massive attack on 5 November. The Serbs withdrew step by step, offering strong resistance at the Kolubara River, but to no avail, due to the lack of artillery ammunition. It was at that time that General Živojin Mišić was made commander of the battered First Army, replacing the wounded Petar Bojović. He insisted on a deep withdrawal in order to give the troops some much-needed rest and to shorten the front. Marshal Putnik finally relented, but the consequence was the abandonment of the capital city of Belgrade. After suffering heavy losses, the Austro-Hungarian Army entered the city on 2 December. This action led Potiorek to move the whole Fifth Army into the Belgrade area and use it to crush the Serbian right flank. This, however, left the Sixth alone for a few days to face the whole Serbian army.

At this point, artillery ammunition finally arrived from France and Greece. In addition, some replacements were sent to the units and Marshal Putnik correctly sensed that the Austro-Hungarian forces were dangerously overstretched and weakened in the previous offensives, so he ordered a full-scale counterattack with the entire Serbian Army on 3 December against the Sixth Army. The Fifth hurried its flanking maneuver, but it was already too late – with the Sixth Army broken, the Second and Third Serbian Armies overwhelmed the Fifth. Finally, Potiorek lost his nerve and ordered yet another retreat back across the rivers into Austria-Hungary's territory. The Serbian Army recaptured Belgrade on 15 December.

The first phase of the war against Serbia had ended with no change in the border, but casualties were enormous compared to earlier wars, albeit comparable to other campaigns of World War I. The Serbian army suffered 170,000 men killed, wounded, captured or missing. Austro-Hungarian losses were approaching 215,000 men killed, wounded or missing.^{[citation needed]}. Austro-Hungarian General Potiorek was removed from command and replaced by Archduke Eugen of Austria (C. Falls p. 54). On the Serbian side, a deadly typhus epidemic killed hundreds of thousands of Serb civilians during the winter.

After the Battle of Kolubara, the Serbian Parliament adopted the Niš Declaration (7 December 1914) on the war goals of Serbia:'Convinced that the entire Serbian nation is determined to persevere in the holy struggle for the defense of their homesteads and their freedom, the government of the Kingdom (of Serbia) considers that, in these fateful times, its main and only task is to ensure the successful completion of this great warfare which, at the moment when it started, also became a struggle for the liberation and unification of all our unliberated Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian brothers. The great success which is to crown this warfare will make up for the extremely bloody sacrifices which this generation of Serbs is making'. This amounted to announcing Serbia's intention to annex extensive amounts of Austria-Hungary's Balkan provinces.

1915[edit]

Prelude[edit]

Early in 1915, with Ottoman defeats at the Battle of Sarikamish and in the First Suez Offensive, the German Chief of the General StaffErich von Falkenhayn tried to convince the Austro-Hungarian Chief of Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf, of the importance of conquering Serbia. If Serbia were taken, then the Germans would have a direct rail link from Germany through Austria-Hungary, then down to Istanbul and beyond. This would allow the Germans to send military supplies and even troops to help the Ottoman Empire. While this was hardly in Austria-Hungary's interests, the Austro-Hungarians did want to defeat Serbia. However, Russia was the more dangerous enemy, and furthermore, with the entry of Italy into the war on the Allied side, the Austro-Hungarians had their hands full (see Italian Front (World War I)).

Both the Allies and the Central Powers tried to get Bulgaria to pick a side in the Great War. Bulgaria and Serbia had fought two wars in the last 30 years: the Serbo-Bulgarian War in 1885, and the Second Balkan War in 1913. The result was that the Bulgarian government and people felt that Serbia was in possession of lands to which Bulgaria was entitled, and when the Central Powers offered to give them what they claimed, the Bulgarians entered the war on their side. With the Allied loss in the Gallipoli campaign and the Russian defeat at Gorlice, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria signed a treaty with Germany and on 23 September 1915, Bulgaria began mobilizing for war.

Opposing forces[edit]

During the preceding nine months, the Serbs had tried and failed to rebuild their battered armies and improve their supply situation. Despite their efforts, the Serbian Army was only about 30,000 men stronger than at the start of the war (around 225,000) and was still badly equipped. Although Britain and France had talked about sending serious military forces to Serbia, nothing was done until it was too late. When Bulgaria began mobilizing, the French and British sent two divisions, but they arrived late in the Greek town of Salonika. Part of the reason for the delay was the National schism in Greek politics of the time that generating conflicting views about the war.

Against Serbia were marshalled the Bulgarian First Army commanded by Kliment Boyadzhiev, the German Eleventh Army commanded by Max von Gallwitz and the Austro-Hungarian Third Army commanded by Hermann Kövess von Kövessháza, all under the control of Field Marshal August von Mackensen. In addition the Bulgarian Second Army commanded by (Georgi Todorov), which remained under the direct control of the Bulgarian high command, was deployed against Macedonia.

Course of the campaign[edit]

The Austro-Hungarians and Germans began their attack on 7 October with their troops crossing the Drina and Sava rivers, covered by heavy artillery fire. Once they crossed the Danube, the Germans and Austro-Hungarians moved on Belgrade itself. Vicious street fighting ensued,^[35] and the Serbs' resistance in the city was finally crushed on 9 October.^[36]

Then, on 14 October, the Bulgarian Army attacked from the north of Bulgaria towards Niš and from the south towards Skopje (see map). The Bulgarian First Army defeated the Serbian Second Army at the Battle of Morava, while the Bulgarian Second Army defeated the Serbians at the Battle of Ovche Pole. With the Bulgarian breakthrough, the Serbian position became untenable; the main army in the north (around Belgrade) could either retreat or be surrounded and forced to surrender. In the Battle of Kosovo, the Serbs made a last and desperate attempt to join the two incomplete Allied divisions that made a limited advance from the south, but were unable to gather enough forces due to the pressure from the north and east. They were halted by the Bulgarians under General Todorov and had to pull back.

Men Of War Mods

Marshal Putnik ordered a full retreat south and west through Montenegro and into Albania. The weather was terrible, the roads poor, and the army had to help the tens of thousands of civilians who retreated with them with almost no supplies or food left. But the bad weather and poor roads worked for the refugees as well, as the Central Powers forces could not press them hard enough, so they evaded capture. Many of the fleeing soldiers and civilians did not make it to the coast, though – they were lost to hunger, disease and attacks by enemy forces and Albanian tribal bands.^[37] The circumstances of the retreat were disastrous. All told, only some 155,000 Serbs, mostly soldiers, reached the coast of the Adriatic Sea and embarked on Allied transport ships that carried the army to various Greek islands (many to Corfu) before being sent to Salonika. The evacuation of the Serbian army from Albania was completed on 10 February 1916. The survivors were so weakened that thousands of them died from sheer exhaustion in the weeks after their rescue. Marshal Putnik had to be carried during the whole retreat and he died around fifteen months later in a hospital in France.

The French and British divisions had marched north from Thessaloniki in October 1915 under the command of French General Maurice Sarrail. The War Office in London was reluctant to advance too deep into Serbia, so the French divisions advanced on their own up the Vardar River. This advance gave some limited help to the retreating Serbian Army, as the Bulgarians had to concentrate larger forces on their southern flank to deal with the threat, which led to the Battle of Krivolak (October–November 1915). By the end of November, General Sarrail had to retreat in the face of massive Bulgarian assaults on his positions. During his retreat, the British at the Battle of Kosturino were also forced to retreat. By 12 December, all allied forces were back in Greece.

The Army of Serbia's ally Montenegro did not follow the Serbs into exile, but retreated to defend their own country. The Austrian-Hungarians launched their Montenegrin campaign on 5 January 1916 and despite some success of The Montenegrins in the Battle of Mojkovac, they were completely defeated within 2 weeks.

This was a nearly complete victory for the Central Powers at a cost of around 67,000 casualties as compared to around 90,000 Serbs killed or wounded and 174,000 captured.^[6] The railroad from Berlin to Istanbul was finally opened. The only flaw in the victory was that much of the Serbian Army had successfully retreated, although it was left very disorganized and required rebuilding.

1916–1918[edit]

In 1917, the Serbs launched the Toplica Uprising and liberated for a short time the area between the Kopaonik mountains and the South Morava river. The uprising was crushed by the joint efforts of Bulgarian and Austrian forces at the end of March 1917.

The Macedonian Front in the beginning was mostly static. French and Serbian forces re-took limited areas of Macedonia by recapturing Bitola on 19 November 1916 as a result of the costly Monastir Offensive, which brought stabilization of the front.

French and Serbian troops finally made a breakthrough, after most of the German and Austro-Hungarian troops had withdrawn. This breakthrough was significant in defeating Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary, which led to the final victory of World War I. The Bulgarians suffered their only defeat of the war at the Battle of Dobro Pole of 15–18 September 1918, but days later, they decisively defeated British and Greek forces at the Battle of Doiran, avoiding occupation. After the Allied breakthrough, Bulgaria capitulated on 29 September 1918.^[38] Hindenburg and Ludendorff concluded that the strategic and operational balance had now shifted decidedly against the Central Powers and insisted on an immediate peace settlement during a meeting with government officials a day after the Bulgarian collapse.^[39]

The disappearance of the Macedonian Front meant that the road to Budapest and Vienna was now opened for the 670,000-strong army of General Franchet d'Esperey as the Bulgarian surrender deprived the Central Powers of the 278 infantry battalions and 1,500 guns (the equivalent of some 25 to 30 German divisions) that were previously holding the line.^[40] The German high command responded by sending only seven infantry and one cavalry division, but these forces were far from enough for a front to be re-established.^[40]

The Allied armies, mostly French, but aided by British, Serbian and Greek troops, pushed forward in September 1918, forced Bulgaria to leave the war and eventually managed to liberate Serbia two weeks before the end of World War I.

Men Of War Movie

End of the War[edit]

The ramifications of the war were manifold. When World War I ended, the Treaty of Neuilly awarded Western Thrace to Greece, whereas Serbia received some minor territorial concessions from Bulgaria. Austria-Hungary was broken apart, and Hungary lost much land to both Yugoslavia and Romania in the Treaty of Trianon. Serbia assumed the leading position in the new Kingdom of Yugoslavia, joined by its old ally, Montenegro. Meanwhile, Italy established a quasi-protectorate over Albania and Greece re-occupied Albania's southern part, which was autonomous under a local Greek provisional government (see Autonomous Republic of Northern Epirus), despite Albania's neutrality during the war.

Casualties[edit]

Before the war, the Kingdom of Serbia had 4,500,000 inhabitants.^[42] According to the New York Times, 150,000 people are estimated to have died in 1915 alone during the worst typhus epidemic in world history. With the aid of the American Red Cross and 44 foreign governments, the outbreak was brought under control by the end of the year.^[43] The number of civilian deaths is estimated by some sources at 650,000, primarily due to the typhus outbreak and famine, but also direct clashes with the occupiers.^[44] Serbia's casualties accounted for 8% of the total Allied military deaths. 58% of the regular Serbian Army (420,000 strong) perished during the conflict.^[45] According to the Serb sources, the total number of casualties is placed around 1,000,000:^[46] 25% of Serbia's prewar size, and an absolute majority (57%) of its overall male population.^[47]L.A. Times and N.Y. Times also cited early Serbian sources which claimed over 1,000,000 victims in their respective articles.^[48][49] Modern western and non-Serb historians put the casualties number either at 45,000 military deaths and 650,000 civilian deaths^[16] or 127,355 military deaths and 82,000 civilian deaths.^[17]

The extent of the Serbian demographic disaster can be illustrated by the statement of the Bulgarian Prime Minister Vasil Radoslavov: 'Serbia ceased to exist' (New York Times, summer 1917).^[50] In July 1918 the US Secretary of StateRobert Lansing urged the Americans of all religions to pray for Serbia in their respective churches.^[51][52]

The Serbian Army suffered a staggering number of casualties. It was largely destroyed near the end of the war, falling from about 420,000^[2] at its peak to about 100,000 at the moment of liberation.

The Serb sources claim that the Kingdom of Serbia lost 1,100,000 inhabitants during the war. Of 4.5 million people, there were 275,000 military deaths and 450,000 among the ordinary citizenry. The civilian deaths were attributable mainly to food shortages and the effects of epidemics such as Spanish flu. In the addition to the military deaths, there were 133,148 wounded. According to the Yugoslav government in 1924, Serbia lost 365,164 soldiers, or 26% of all mobilized personnel, while France suffered 16.8%, Germany 15.4%, Russia 11.5%, and Italy 10.3%.^{[citation needed]}

At the end of the war, there were 114,000 disabled soldiers and 500,000 orphaned children.^[53]

Attacks against ethnic Serb civilians[edit]

The assassination in Sarajevo of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg, was followed by violent anti-Serb demonstrations of angry Croats and Muslims^[55] in the city during the evening of 28 June 1914 and for much of the following day. This happened because most Croats and many Muslims considered the archduke the best hope for the establishment of a South Slav political entity within the Habsburg Empire. The crowd directed its anger principally at shops owned by ethnic Serbs and the residences of prominent Serbs. Two ethnic Serbs were killed on 28 June by crowd violence.^[56] That night there were anti-Serb demonstrations in other parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.^[57][58]

Incited by anti-Serbian propaganda with the collusion of the command of the Austro-Hungarian Army, soldiers committed numerous atrocities against the Serbs in both Serbia and Austria-Hungary. According to the Swiss criminologist and observer R.A. Reiss, it was a 'system of extermination'. In addition to executions of prisoners of war, civilian populations were subjected to mass murder and rape. Villages and towns were burned and looted. Fruit trees were cut down and water wells were poisoned in an effort on the Austro-Hungarian part to discourage Serb inhabitants from ever returning.^[59][60][61]

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See also[edit]

References[edit]

1. ^Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg — Wien: Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 1930. — Vol. 1. pg. 759. This is the total number of soldiers who served on the Balkans until the middle of December 1914.
2. ^ ^abchttp://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-1/serbia/organization/1914/
3. ^Thomas & Babac. 'Armies in the Balkans 1914–1918' pg.12
4. ^Lyon 2015, p. 234.
5. ^ ^abГеорги Бакалов, 'История на Българите: Военна история на българите от древността до наши дни', p.463
6. ^ ^abcSpencer Tucker, 'Encyclopedia of World War I'(2005) pg 1077, ISBN1851094202
7. ^Lyon 2015, p. 235.
8. ^DiNardo 2015, p. 122.
9. ^Number is for total Montenegrin losses in the war, including the Macedonian Front.
10. ^International Labour Office, Enquête sur la production. Rapport général. Paris [etc.] Berger-Levrault, 1923–25. Tom 4 , II Les tués et les disparus p.29
11. ^Military Casualties-World War-Estimated,' Statistics Branch, GS, War Department, 25 February 1924; cited in World War I: People, Politics, and Power, published by Britannica Educational Publishing (2010) Page 219
12. ^Urlanis, Boris (1971). Wars and Population. Moscow Pages 66,79,83, 85,160,171 and 268.
13. ^Fred Singleton (1985). A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples. Cambridge University Press. p. 129. ISBN9780521274852.
14. ^Чедомир Антић, Судњи рат, Политика од 14. септембра 2008.
15. ^Владимир Радомировић, Највећа српска победа, Политика од 14. септембра 2008.
16. ^ ^abSammis 2002, p. 32.
17. ^ ^abTucker 2005, p. 273.
18. ^ ^abKeegan 1998, pp. 48–49
19. ^Willmott 2003, pp. 2–23
20. ^Willmott 2003, p. 26
21. ^Willmott 2003, p. 27
22. ^ ^abÖsterreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg 1914 - 1918, vol. 1, Wienn 1930, p68
23. ^http://digi.landesbibliothek.at/viewer/image/AC03568741/1/LOG_0003/Die Entwicklung der öst.-ung. Wehrmacht in den ersten zwei Kriegsjahren, 10
24. ^http://digi.landesbibliothek.at/viewer/image/AC01351505/1/LOG_0003/ Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg 1914 -1918, vol. 2 Beilagen, Wienn 1930, table I )
25. ^http://honsi.org/literature/svejk/dokumenty/oulk/band1.html Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg 1914 - 1918, vol. 1, Wienn 1930, p68
26. ^ ^abJordan 2008, p. 20
27. ^Willmott 2009, p. 69
28. ^James Lyon, A peasant mob: The Serbian army in the eve of the Great War, JMH 61, 1997, p501
29. ^James Lyon, p496
30. ^Thomas, Nigel. Armies in the Balkans 1914-18. p. 38. ISBN1-84176-194-X.
31. ^Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg 1914 - 1918, vol. 1, Wienn 1930, p.82
32. ^Gordon Martel, The Origins of the First World War, Pearson Longman, Harlow, 2003, p. xii f.
33. ^Jordan 2008, p. 25
34. ^Jordan 2008, p. 31
35. ^Jordan 2008, p. 53
36. ^Willmott 2008, p. 120
37. ^Tucker & Roberts 2005, pp. 1075–6
38. ^Tucker, Wood & Murphy 1999, p. 120
39. ^Robert A. DOUGHTY (2005). Pyrrhic Victory. Harvard University Press. pp. 491–. ISBN978-0-674-01880-8.
40. ^ ^abKorsun, N. 'The Balkan Front of the World War (in Russian)'. militera.lib.ru. Retrieved 27 September 2010.
41. ^Mitrović 2007, p. 223.
42. ^'Serbia in 1914'.
43. ^'$1,600,000 was raised for the Red Cross'(PDF). The New York Times. 29 October 1915.
44. ^'First World War.com - Feature Articles - The Minor Powers During World War One - Serbia'. www.firstworldwar.com.
45. ^Serbian army, August 1914
46. ^'Политика Online'. www.politika.rs.
47. ^Тема недеље : Највећа српска победа : Сви српски тријумфи : ПОЛИТИКА‹See Tfd›(in Serbian)
48. ^'Fourth of Serbia's population dead'. Archived from the original on 2013-07-21. Retrieved 2017-07-07.
49. ^'Asserts Serbians face extinction'(PDF).
50. ^'Serbia restored'(PDF).
51. ^'Serbia and Austria'(PDF). New York Times. 28 July 1918.
52. ^'Appeals to Americans to pray for Serbians'(PDF). New York Times. 27 July 1918.
53. ^Banac, Ivo (1988). The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics. Cornell University Press. p. 222. ISBN9780801494932. its postwar population included some 114,000 invalids and over half a million orphans
54. ^Honzík, Miroslav; Honzíková, Hana (1984). 1914/1918, Léta zkázy a naděje. Czech Republic: Panorama.
55. ^Christopher Bennett (1995). Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences. C. Hurst & Co. Publishers. p. 259. Retrieved 7 September 2013.
56. ^Robert J. Donia (2006). Sarajevo: A Biography. University of Michigan Press. pp. 123–. ISBN0-472-11557-X.
57. ^Joseph Ward Swain (1933). Beginning the twentieth century: a history of the generation that made the war. W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
58. ^Christopher Bennett (January 1995). Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences. C. Hurst & Co. Publishers. pp. 31–. ISBN978-1-85065-232-8.
59. ^How Austria-Hungary waged war in Serbia (1915) German criminologist R.A. Reiss on atrocities by the Austro-Hungarian army
60. ^Augenzeugen. Der Krieg gegen Zivilisten. Fotografien aus dem Ersten Weltkrieg Anton Holzer, Vienna
61. ^'Executions, various'. www.ww1-propaganda-cards.com.

Sources[edit]

Books

• Babac, Dušan M. (2016). The Serbian Army in the Great War, 1914-1918. Solihull: Helion.
• Bataković, Dušan T., ed. (2005). Histoire du peuple serbe [History of the Serbian People] (in French). Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme.
• Buttar, Prit (2014). Collision of Empires: The War on the Eastern Front in 1914. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
• Ćirković, Sima (2004). The Serbs. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
• Cox, John K. (2002). The History of Serbia. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
• DiNardo, Richard L. (2015). Invasion: The Conquest of Serbia, 1915. Santa Barbara: Praeger.
• Đorđević, M. P.; Živojinović, D. R. (1991). Srbija i Jugosloveni za vreme rata 1914-1918. 5. Beograd: Biblioteka grada Beograda.
• Dragnich, Alex N. (2004). Serbia Through the Ages. Boulder: East European Monographs.
• Falls, Cyril, The Great War (1960) 978-1440800924
• Fryer, Charles (1997). The Destruction of Serbia in 1915. New York: Columbia University Press.
• Gumz, Jonathan E. (2009). The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914-1918. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Hadži-Vasiljević, Jovan (1922). Bugarska zverstva u Vranju i okolini, 1915-1918. Zastava.
• Jordan, David (2008). The Balkans, Italy & Africa 1914–1918: From Sarajevo to the Piave and Lake Tanganyika. London: Amber Books.
• Lyon, James B. (2015). Serbia and the Balkan Front, 1914: The Outbreak of the Great War. London: Bloomsbury.
• Mitrović, Andrej (2007). Serbia's Great War 1914-1918. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.
• Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg 1914 - 1918, vol. 1, Wienn 1930 [1]
• Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg 1914 -1918, vol. 2 Beilagen, Wienn 1931 [2]
• Pavlowitch, Stevan K. (2002). Serbia: The History behind the Name. London: Hurst & Company.
• Sammis, Kathy (2002). Focus on World History: The Twentieth Century. 5. Walch Publishing. p. 32. ISBN9780825143717.
• Temperley, Harold W. V. (1919) [1917]. History of Serbia(PDF) (2 ed.). London: Bell and Sons.
• Tomac, Petar; Đurašinović, Radomir (1973). Prvi svetski rat, 1914-1918. Vojnoizdavački zavod.
• Tucker, Spencer (2005). World War I: Encyclopedia, Volume 1. ABC-CLIO. p. 273. ISBN9781851094202.
• Willmott, H. P. (2003). World War I. Dorling Kindersley. ISBN978-0-7894-9627-0.
• Willmott, H. P. (2008). World War I. Dorling Kindersley. ISBN978-1-4053-2986-6.
• Willmott, H. P. (2009). World War I. Dorling Kindersley. ISBN978-0-7566-5015-5.

Journals

• Pisarri, Milovan (2013). 'Bulgarian Crimes Against Civilians in Occupied Serbia during the First World War'. Balcanica. 44: 357–390.
• Radić, Radmila (2015). 'The Serbian Orthodox Church in the First World War'. The Serbs and the First World War 1914-1918. Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. pp. 263–285.
• Radojević, Mira (2015). 'Jovan M. Jovanović on the outbreak of the First World War'. The Serbs and the First World War 1914-1918. Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. pp. 187–204.
• Stojančević, V. (1988). 'Srbija i srpski narod za vreme rata i okupacije 1914-1918. godine'. Leskovac: Narodni muzej u Leskovcu.

External links[edit]

• Bjelajac, Mile: Serbia , in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
• Tasić, Dmitar: Warfare 1914-1918 (South East Europe) , in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
• 'Jugoslovenska kinoteka' (in Serbian). Kinoteka.
• Popović, Andra (1926). Ратни албум : 1914-1918. Збирка књига Универзитетске библиотеке у Београду (in Serbian). Digital National Library of Serbia.
• W. H. Crawfurd Price (1918). Serbia's Part in the War .. Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Company. (Public Domain)